A structural approach to the study of intra-organizational coalitions by Walsh, Dean T
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
2006
A structural approach to the study of intra-
organizational coalitions
Dean T. Walsh
University of South Florida
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Walsh, Dean T., "A structural approach to the study of intra-organizational coalitions" (2006). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/2744
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Structural Approach to the Study 
 
of Intra-Organizational Coalitions 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Dean T. Walsh 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Management and Organization 
College of Business Administration 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Walter Nord, Ph.D. 
Cynthia Cohen, Ph.D. 
John Jermier, Ph.D. 
Alvin Wolfe, Ph.D. 
 
 
Date of Approval: 
June 28, 2006 
 
 
 
Keywords: informal groups, formation, structure, social network analysis 
 
© Copyright 2006, Dean T. Walsh
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It’s over. Finally. To suggest that my path to completion was indirect would be a 
gross understatement. Nonetheless, I have beaten the odds and can finally remove 
‘dissertation’ from my to-do list. I am grateful to all of my committee members for their 
perseverance, understanding and help over the years. This manuscript and my ideas on 
the subject have improved significantly with their guidance. I wish to express special 
gratitude to my Major Professor, Dr. Walter Nord. Without his unflappable 
encouragement this simply would not have been possible. After each interruption, and 
there were many, he was ready to continue without hesitation. Also, I am indebted to Dr. 
Alvin Wolfe for not only steering me through the intricacies of network methodologies, 
but for developing my overall interest and understanding of social networks from the 
beginning. Finally, but most importantly, I wish to thank my wife, Gretchen. Her patience 
and support (frequently worn thin) proved to be instrumental in completing my degree. At 
the end of the day she was right about a great many things. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables iii 
 
List of Figures v 
 
Abstract vi 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 1 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 4 
 Coalition Research in Social Psychology 5 
  Reward maximization 5 
  Coalition size 6 
  Actor resources 6 
  Power and control 6 
  Other variables 7 
 Comments on Coalition Research in Social Psychology 9 
 Coalition Research in Political Science 11 
  Size 12 
  Ideology 13 
 Comments on Coalition Research in Political Science 15 
 Coalition Research in Organization Studies 16 
 Comments on Research in Organization Studies 18 
 Summary of the Coalition Literature 19 
 
Chapter Three: Structural Analysis & Coalitions 22 
 Organizational Coalitions Defined 22 
 Structure, Interactions and Coalitions 24 
 Social Network Analysis 25 
 Chapter Summary 27 
 
Chapter Four: Research Methods 28 
 Research Design 28 
 Research Instruments and Data 29 
  Semi-structured interviews 29 
  Network self-report instruments 30 
  Rokeach Value Survey 31 
 Pilot Research 34 
 Research Setting 35 
 Research Protocols 37 
 Data Collection 39 
 Data Analysis 41 
 
 i
Chapter Five: Results 45 
 Organization Background 45 
 Descriptive Statistics 49 
 Survey Data 50 
 Coalition Identification 53 
  Individual influence 53 
  Collaborative influence 54 
 Member Issues 55 
 Coalitions 57 
  Coalition 1 58 
  Coalition 1 analyses 61 
  Coalition 2 63 
  Coalition 2 analyses 66 
  Comparative analyses 67 
 Chapter Summary 70 
 
Chapter Six: Discussion 72 
 Research Limitations 76 
 Future Research 78 
 
References  82 
 
Appendices  96 
 Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 97 
 Appendix B: Network Self-Report Instruments 98 
 Appendix C: Rokeach Value Survey 102 
 Appendix D: Participant’s Memo 106 
 Appendix E: Network Data Sets 107 
 
About the Author End Page 
 ii
  
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Schedule of Research Activity 40 
Table 2. Software, Inc. Member Profiles 50 
Table 3. Software, Inc. RVS Rankings 51 
Table 4. Density and Centralization Measures 52 
Table 5. Perceptions of Power/Influence 54 
Table 6. Perceptions of Collaborative Influence 54 
Table 7. Important Organizational Issues 55 
Table 8. Evidence for Possible Coalition Activity 58 
Table 9. Rokeach Value Survey 113 
Table 10. Coalition and Non-Coalition RVS Means 115 
Table 11. RVS Rank Order Differences (C1, C2, Non) 116 
Table 12. Social Network Degree Centrality (Binary) 117 
Table 13. Work Network Degree Centrality (Binary) 118 
Table 14. Social Network Degree Centrality (Valued) 119 
Table 15. Work Network Degree Centrality (Valued) 120 
Table 16. Coalition 1 Structural Equivalence 121 
Table 17. Coalition 2 Structural Equivalence 122 
Table 18. Work Network Structural Equivalence 123 
Table 19. Social Network Structural Equivalence 124 
Table 20. Work Network N-Clans 125 
Table 21. Social Network N-Clans 126 
 iii
Table 22. Work Network Lambda Sets 127 
Table 23. Social Network Lambda Sets 128 
Table 24. Quadratic Assignment Procedure 129 
 iv
  
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Software, Inc. Structure 48 
Figure 2. Work Network Diagram 109 
Figure 3. Social Network Diagram 110 
Figure 4. Coalition 1 Diagram 111 
Figure 5. Coalition 2 Diagram 112 
 
 
 v
  
 
A Structural Approach to the Study 
of Intra-Organizational Coalitions 
 
Dean T. Walsh 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Coalitions are widely associated with collective or collaborative attempts to 
influence organizational members, decisions, policies and events. Yet, surprisingly, 
relatively little is known about how coalitions develop within organizations. Employing an 
exploratory case study design and using social network analysis, the Rokeach Value 
Survey, and semi-structured interviews, this research demonstrated that it is possible to 
identify and study coalitions in a real organizational setting. I suggest that the inclusion 
and investigation of member relationships may advance the state of the art in 
organizational coalition research. A benefit of this study, and contrary to most coalition 
research, is that it used multiple forms of data, including demographic, historical, values-
based and interaction patterns for work and social relationships. 
Two coalitions were identified in the organization studied. Formation centered on 
a single issue and each coalition followed a strategy designed to influence a possible 
change in structure and operation. Coalition members exhibited similarities across 
several factors, including tenure within the organization, education, race, age, and 
previous experiences. Analyses showed some similarity in member values within and 
between coalitions. The coalition attempting to maintain the current work structure 
demonstrated higher value similarity with non-coalition members. Social network 
analysis revealed that coalition members tended to be structurally similar to each other, 
 vi
more centrally located in the work network, and had higher correlation between coalition 
interactions and existing social relationships. 
 vii
  
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
The concept of coalitions appears frequently in classical and contemporary 
organization studies (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Bazerman, Curhan, Moore & 
Valley, 2000; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass, 1992; Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Cobb, 
1991; Mannix, 1993; March, 1962; Mintzberg, 1983; Oliver, 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Thompson, 1967). Coalitions are widely associated with informal and collective or 
collaborative attempts to influence organizational members, decisions, policies and 
events. In fact, it has been more than four decades since Thibault and Kelley (1959) 
described coalitions as two or more parties who agree to cooperate to obtain a mutually 
desired outcome. Yet, surprisingly, relatively little is known about how coalitions develop 
within organizations (Bazerman, 1986; Cobb, 1991, 1986; Stevenson, Pearce & Porter, 
1985; van Beest, 2002). 
Extant views derived primarily from social psychology and political science 
generally state that individuals form coalitions to optimize some known and measurable 
outcome. Within this work, coalition formation typically is portrayed as a series of 
discrete and rational bargains governed by individual opportunities for achieving 
maximized payoffs (Cobb, 1986; De Winter, Andeweg & Dumont, 2002; Gentry, 1987; 
Murnighan, 1978; van Beest, 2002). 
Alternative explanations of coalition processes (i.e., those not based on the 
maximization of a clear and tangible reward) have been suggested, but have been only 
partially developed in the organization literature. Several researchers within this field 
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(Diani & Bison, 2004; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Lawler & Youngs, 1975; Murnighan 
& Brass, 1991; Thurman, 1979) have suggested that coalitions may develop around 
similar socio-demographic variables such as age, friendship, physical proximity to 
others, titles, prior experiences and ideologies. 
 The present study attempts to advance coalition research by clarifying our 
general understanding of the development of intra-organizational coalitions through an 
exploratory field study that examined the determinants and structure of the personal 
relationships that define these groups. A primary assumption of my research is that the 
study of coalition interaction patterns, as sub-sets of larger systems of interactions (i.e., 
organizations), can offer improvements to the current body of research on organizational 
coalitions. A major concern of the present study is why certain organization members, 
given the range of all possible interactions, form coalitions. 
 The general plan of this research was to use social network analysis to map and 
assess coalition and non-coalition members’ interaction patterns within larger 
organizational work and social (non-work) networks. Then, additional data were used to 
better understand the determinants of the interaction patterns and coalition dynamics. 
This included evaluating coalition variables identified in the extant social psychology and 
political science literatures (e.g., rewards, control of others), as well as those mentioned 
in the organization literature (e.g., structural, social, demographic). 
The following sections outline the rationale behind this study. First, determinants 
of coalitions derived from social psychology, political science, and organization studies 
are identified. Investigation of this research revealed that relatively little is known about 
the patterned interactions that define organizational coalitions. Then, the significance of 
organization context, interaction patterns, structural analyses, and the technical issues of 
this exploratory case study methodology are addressed. A structural viewpoint (social 
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network analysis) is recommended as a useful means to better understand these 
important groups. The following research questions emerged from review of the existing 
coalition literature: 
1) What are the bases for the relationships that characterize intra-organizational 
coalitions? To reiterate, the existing literature base frequently assumes coalitions 
within organizations, but generally does not explain the manner in which they arise. 
In laboratory experiments formation is simply dependent on the resources assigned 
to each player. 
2) Do similar structural properties exist among intra-organizational coalitions? Are intra-
organizational coalitions structurally equivalent to any pre-existing interaction 
patterns?  In other words, are coalition interaction patterns or structures similar to 
segments of established organization interaction patterns or structures? An analysis 
of coalition structure has not been conducted. By comparing coalitions networks 
(structures) to larger organizational networks I hope to help explain formation and 
coalition dynamics. 
3) How do intra-organizational coalitions change over time? Again, coalitions are widely 
assumed in organizations, and they are believed to be temporary occurrences. 
However, it is unclear, for example, how certain organizational variables effect their 
duration and whether or not coalitions are repeatable. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 The coalition literature is extensive. However, to date, most of this research has 
been done within the fields of social psychology and political science (Cobb, 1986: Cook 
& Gilmore, 1984; De Winter, et al., 2002). As I demonstrate in this chapter, there are two 
significant limitations to this body of work for understanding coalition formation in 
organizations. First, the coalition literature provides little insight into coalition 
development within organizations. The vast majority of this research has been based on 
game experiments focusing primarily on the distribution of coalition rewards. 
Consequently, there are plenty of explanations for post-formation processes (e.g., the 
allocation of points, votes or money) but there is little to explain how and why coalitions 
actually form within organizations. 
 Second, the research that has addressed coalition development often has been 
based on specific assumptions, making its application to organizations problematic. This 
also is due, in part, to the reliance on laboratory experiments as the primary means of 
inquiry. Game-based experiments typically assume actors are driven solely by the 
acquisition of a tangible reward, have perfect knowledge of all game conditions, and rely 
strictly on negotiation (bargaining) as a means of interaction and governance. Such 
conditions may not be realistic representations of organizations. 
 In the following sections I identify the most significant coalition research within 
the fields of social psychology, political science and organization studies as it pertains to 
the present study, discuss the key variables developed within the literature, and 
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comment on their application to coalition research within organizations. To reiterate, I 
contend that the research pertaining to coalition formation contains gaps that stem from 
the techniques and assumptions associated with coalition research in laboratory 
settings. 
Coalition Research in Social Psychology 
 As indicated above, most of the social psychological research on coalitions has 
focused on post-formation processes such as reward distribution. Researchers have 
attempted to explain how coalition members should divide resources and identify the 
coalitions that are likely to form given pre-determined resource allocations (Cook & 
Gilmore, 1984; Komorita & Parks, 1995; van Beest, 2002; Wilke, 1985). Consequently, 
coalition formation typically has been assumed as part of the rules or requirements of 
various game experiments. Consistent with its strong focus on rewards, the primary 
formation variable identified in this literature has been payoff maximization. This 
emphasis has eclipsed the attention to other variables such as coalition size, actor 
resources, power and control, gender and status. Even though these variables have 
been studied, the research on them has focused primarily on their impacts on reward 
optimization. This research is discussed below. 
 Reward maximization. Reward or payoff maximization is perhaps the most 
commonly used explanation of coalition formation (Back & Dumont, 2004; De Winter et 
al., 2002). While rarely tested in ‘real-world’ conditions, maximization or optimization has 
been assumed in nearly all social psychological theories of coalitions, including Caplow 
(1956, 1959), Chertkoff (1967, 1970), Crott and Albers (1981), Gamson (1961, 1964), 
Komorita (1974, 1979), Komorita and Chertkoff (1973), Rapoport and Kahan (1982) and 
Vinacke (1971). The rationale behind formation based on reward maximization is that 
people form coalitions simply because membership will increase the likelihood of 
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attaining some mutually identified benefit (i.e., a reward). Within this body of research, 
coalitions typically have been equated to majorities within a larger group of game 
participants, and following game rules, majorities dictate the distribution of rewards. 
 Coalition size. Size also has been identified as a variable that influences coalition 
formation. For example, according to Komorita’s (1974) weighted probability theory and 
its variants (Komorita & Miller, 1986) the probabilities of coalition formation are inversely 
related to coalition size. While the theory also assumed payoff maximization, it indicated 
that complexity related to group activities such as bargaining, communicating offers and 
decision-making made it more difficult to form large coalitions than smaller ones. As the 
number of potential coalition members increases, difficulty in achieving optimization and 
attaining consensus on reward distribution also increases. 
 Actor resources. Several theories have focused on actor resources to predict 
coalition formation, albeit for maximization purposes. Gamson (1961, 1964), Chertkoff 
(1970), Komorita and Chertkoff (1973), Komorita (1979), Crott and Albers (1981), and 
Rapoport and Kahan (1982) stated that the resources potential members brought to 
coalitions determined coalition formation. Resources, typically money or points allocated 
prior to the start of games, drove the bargaining processes related to member 
distributions and coalition alternatives (the number of coalitions possible for formation). 
 Power and control. Caplow (1956, 1959) and later Chertkoff (1967) provided one 
of the most useful theories of coalition processes. They stated that a group of actors 
would attempt to control as many other actors as possible outside the coalition. Caplow 
argued that the actors with the most resources within the coalition would try to control 
those with fewer resources (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Murnighan, 1978). Essentially, 
actor resources determined which coalitions could create majorities (enabling the 
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domination over outsiders) and which actors were subject to control within coalitions (the 
domination over insiders). 
 This work is fundamentally different than most other coalition research because 
actors are assumed to be in competition for the control of others, acknowledging that 
coalitions form for more socially-oriented ends (power or influence over others) and not 
simply for some externally provided reward (Cook & Gilmore, 1984). In addition, Caplow 
(1959) stated that actors excluded from coalitions were still crucial to the games (as 
dominated others) and thus to the understanding of coalition processes because 
attempts to avoid domination would lead weaker actors into counter-coalitions. 
 Other variables. Several researchers (Gamson, 1964; Vinacke, 1971) have 
reported that coalition formation may be influenced by the gender of the game 
participants. These researchers suggested that females were more likely to form larger 
than minimal coalitions, split payoffs evenly regardless of power position, and make 
proposals (bargain) that were not in their own best interest. This is interesting because it 
is directly counter to the popular maximization principle dominant in the coalition 
literature. Conversely, males were believed to exploit other actors more frequently, 
demonstrate stronger drives to win and to increase the level of competition in the game. 
Laing and Morrison (1973, 1974) proposed that players formed coalitions to advance (or 
at least maintain) their relative positions in a known status system. They assumed 
players were aware of their overall rank (status) and even that they could interpret the 
intervals between players. Unfortunately, theories of coalition formation based on gender 
and status have not been strongly supported (Murnighan, 1978; van Beest, 2002). 
 In another deviation from earlier coalition theories, Dreze and Greenberg (1980) 
proposed the idea that the value of a coalition to a potential member depends 
significantly on the identity of the other members of the coalition. This ‘simple’ hedonic 
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model suggested that actors strongly consider other members rather than only the 
rewards likely to be obtained in the winning coalition. Unfortunately, this research did not 
explore the factors that fostered strong or weak identification between actors. Toward 
this end, other researchers (Boros, Gurvich & Vasin, 1997 and Cechlarova & Romero-
Medina 2001) attempted to incorporate actor preferences into game experiments. 
However, these preferences were limited to game rule modifications. 
Similarly to Caplow (1959), Simpson (2004) argued that low power actors and 
even those excluded from coalition membership were still important to coalition 
processes. He suggested that structural or hierarchical position affects not only 
bargaining power but also the ability of low-power actors to organize against unequal 
bargaining power. It was found that collective action among low-power actors (those with 
relatively fewer game resources) was facilitated by identification with others who were 
also determined to be structurally disadvantaged. Simpson proposed two models in this 
research. In the collectivist model, actors attempted to minimize in-group inequality. In 
the utilitarian model, actors attempted to maximize the greatest good for the greatest 
number of actors (including non-coalition actors). Results for the collectivist model 
showed strong support for male and female participants while the utilitarian model 
showed only limited support among female participants. 
This work is important because it suggested that players in coalition games may 
not only be concerned with maximizing their own outcome, but also concerned with what 
happens to other players, including excluded actors. This is similar to and supported by 
research on social exclusion (Baumeister, & Leary, 1995; Leary, 1990; Williams, 1997, 
Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) where actors’ behaviors are influenced by those 
omitted from participation. In addition, this work highlights a potentially different 
interpretation of fairness. Typically in coalition research, fairness has been construed as 
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an agreement that is closely linked to self-interest, meaning than an actor would agree to 
an outcome (i.e., consider it fair) if it met his or her reward expectation. This is 
particularly relevant in game experiments (and other situations) where social norms are 
used to govern the internal conflict that arises when people want to maximize their own 
outcome at the expense of others (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1997). 
 By considering excluded actors, this research essentially broadened the concept 
of fairness (at least in game experiments). Simpson (2004) demonstrated that even 
when it was possible to obtain a reasonable share of the reward in a small coalition, 
actors with a more social orientation were inclined to form a coalition that included (and 
benefited) a greater number of actors. In other words, actors with a social orientation 
would reduce their own payoff in order not to negatively affect the outcome of other 
actors. This suggested a moral element to the idea of fairness that linked concern for 
one’s self with the concern for others. However, in work somewhat counter to the above 
research, van Beest, Wilke & van Dijk (2004) found that socially oriented excluded 
actors (‘pro-socials’) were less likely to form counter coalitions when payoffs diminished. 
On the other hand, actors with more of a self-orientation (‘pro-selfs’) preferred 
participation in counter coalitions regardless of payoff. 
Comments on Coalition Research in Social Psychology 
 In this section I assess the usefulness and limitations of this body of research as 
it relates to the present study. As indicated, this literature identifies several variables that 
may be helpful to the present study, specifically reward maximization, coalition size, 
actor resources, the control of others, and most recently identification with others and 
fairness. 
 As stated earlier, reward maximization is the most commonly cited factor in 
coalition formation. Even though the role of rewards may have been exaggerated in 
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game-based experiments, they do provide a possible explanation of coalition activity. 
While it is likely that in organizations the purposes of coalitions may be less tangible than 
attaining game points or votes (e.g., a policy change), the idea of specific purposes or 
objectives with desirable outcomes likely remain valid reasons for coalition formation. 
 Size also may be important in organization coalitions and hence to the present 
study. Within social psychological research, smaller coalitions (minimization) have been 
predicted for two reasons. First, smaller coalitions offer proportionately greater payoffs 
for members. Second, as mentioned, smaller size is viewed as a means by which 
potential relationship maintenance problems can be mitigated. This is particularly 
important to the present study because coalitions are defined by member relationships 
or interactions. 
 In laboratory experiments, actor resources serve as the basis for participant 
interaction. They are easily controlled and provide a mechanism for people who do not 
have any other reasons for such interaction. In organizations, it is expected that people 
provide certain benefits as coalition members. Examples may include sources of 
friendship and support, access to powerful others and systems or even sources of 
information. 
 The idea of control (or power) in this literature remains important even though it 
has been narrowly interpreted within the game parameters. According to Mannix and 
White (1992), one of the fundamental factors driving coalition formation is a disparity in 
power (the ability to influence). Accordingly, coalition formation offers less-powerful 
actors the opportunity to attain more power through concerted or coordinated action. I 
expected such power, perhaps manifested as the ability to influence decisions, to be a 
key objective of coalition activity in organizations and hence pertinent to the current 
study. 
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 Finally, research from social psychology suggests two additional potential factors 
in coalition formation, namely positive identification with others and fairness. Within 
organizations positive identification (to others) as a formation variable could be driven by 
status (similarity as well as the desire to attain more), friendship or beliefs. Positive 
identification may also be linked to similarity in network position. The concept of fairness 
beyond one’s own interest may also link strongly with belief systems. In short, these two 
variables come closest to the notion that coalitions within organizations may form for 
reasons other than maximization such as social reasons. 
 Despite this work, the application of coalition research from social psychology to 
an organizational setting must be done with caution. The primary reasons for this 
concern are the narrow views of coalitions and the assumptions within which they have 
been specified. Again, game actors are assumed to be driven solely by a utility 
maximization principle typically reflected in the pursuit of some external reward such as 
money, points, or votes (Bazerman, 1986; Cobb, 1986; DeSwaan, 1985). In addition, 
individual objectives are assumed to be unanimous (e.g., completion of the game) and 
bargaining or negotiation is the primary means of member acquisition, governance, and 
outcome distribution (Cobb, 1986; Komorita, Aquino & Ellis, 1989; Murnighan, 1986). 
Other limiting assumptions include zero-sum conditions, operation within unambiguous 
boundaries, and perfect knowledge where actors have total and accurate information 
regarding the game, rewards, and other actors' resources and options (Bacharach & 
Lawler, 1980; Cobb, 1986; Miller & Komorita, 1986; van der Linden & Verbeek, 1985). 
Obviously, life in organizations violates many of these assumptions. 
Coalition Research in Political Science 
 Political scientists have focused mainly on the role of competing political 
agendas, loosely framed as ideologies, and size as key factors influencing coalition 
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formation (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; De Winter et al., 2002). However, as with coalition 
research in social psychology, the attainment of some reward (maximization) remains a 
prevalent theme in nearly all views on coalition formation. The main variables discussed 
below are size and ideology. 
 Size. Riker's (1962) size principle is regarded as the field's first coalition research 
and its most prominent and tested model (Murnighan, 1978). Riker’s work predicted that 
minimal coalitions would form (where removal of a single member would render it no 
longer winning). The winning coalition controlled the smallest amount of resources 
(votes) necessary to realize success (this is similar to Gamson's minimum resource 
theory). Riker added that if perfect information were not attainable then larger than 
minimal coalitions would form. 
 Several variations on Riker's model can be found in the political science 
literature. Leiserson's (1968) bargaining proposition predicts that the number of parties 
(rather than the number of actors) in a coalition will be as small as possible. Koehler 
(1972) relaxed Riker’s zero sum assumption and has shown that minimum winning 
coalitions can occur in non-zero sum games. In addition, Dodd's (1974) multi-party 
parliament model predicts minimum winning coalitions. The primary distinction here is 
that minimum winning coalitions are defined as those that are no longer winning with the 
removal of any party (rather than the removal of a single game participant). 
 Diermeier and Merlo (2000) and Baron and Diermeier (2001) developed the 
efficient bargaining approach to coalition politics to provide an explanation for the size 
diversity of coalitions. According to these researchers, the party in charge of putting 
together a coalition could attain the support of other parties by offering a compromise to 
policy positions in return for support. Here, parties are able to generate equilibrium 
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governments which can be larger than minimum. This is a major point of departure since 
most research since Riker (1962) consistently predicted minimum winning coalitions. 
 Ideology. A number of researchers (Axelrod, 1970; Leiserson, 1966, 1970; 
Rosenthal, 1970) have tried to incorporate ideological diversity into coalition research. 
Generally, this work (called minimum range models) predicted parties with similar 
ideologies were most likely to form coalitions. Axelrod's (1970) conflict of interest model 
offered a variation, where conflict of interest rather than ideological diversity was 
minimized. Here, winning coalitions simply would be those that represented the least 
conflict of interest among members. 
 In contrast to the research in social psychology, DeSwaan (1970, 1973) used 
ideology to argue against small size, predicting the formation of larger than minimal 
coalitions. His policy distance minimization model, based on the assumption that 
influencing governmental policies was a political party's primary goal, predicted that 
parties would attempt to become the most central party within a coalition government. 
Thus, parties to the ideological right would be valued by parties that are to the right of 
the median of potential coalition members. Here, perceived balance (centrality) was 
more important than limits to coalition size (Murnighan, 1978). 
 More recent developments in coalition research within political science were due 
to the limited empirical success of earlier theories (often referred to as the rational 
choice school). According to Martin and Stevenson (2001) the overall level of theory 
development and empirical testing in political science has not resulted in significant 
progress in the explanation and prediction of real-world coalition governments. 
 The neo-institutional view of coalitions emerged in the late 1980s as a major 
alternative to the traditional approaches to coalition research in governments. This view 
emphasized the role of different types of institutions in coalition formation processes. As 
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with the historical approaches, the neo-institutional ideas did not reject the rationale 
behind reward maximization, but refined it with additional hypotheses drawn from 
experiences with institutional rules (Martin & Stevenson, 2001). In this research 
institutions were defined as any restriction on the set of viable coalitions that exist 
beyond the short-term control of model actors (typically cabinet level politicians and 
administrators and parties), and as such act as constraints on coalition formation 
processes and outcomes (Strom, Budge & Laver, 1994). Thus, differences in coalition 
outcomes were predicted on the basis of institutional differences with regard to coalition 
bargaining rules and norms that allocate power differently between actors in the 
bargaining process. 
Institution rules included the order in which bargaining parties were asked to form 
a government, the ability to control the timing of cabinet announcements (an advantage) 
and to a lesser extent incumbent coalition partners (Laver & Schofield 1990; Lijphart, 
1999; Mershon, 1994, 2001). Unfortunately, neo-institutional theories usually do not 
make explicit assumptions regarding coalition formation behavior and outcomes and 
only narrow down the vast majority of possible coalitions. As a result, De Vries (1999) 
criticized neo-institutional models for their lack of formalization and argued that they 
could not be considered complete coalition formation theories. 
Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1996) focused on bargaining on ministerial portfolios 
(seats) rather than on coalition membership. Their main hypothesis was that coalition 
bargaining was determined by the credibility of proposals for alternatives to the 
incumbent government. This credibility depended crucially on the proposed allocation of 
cabinet portfolios in the new government. 
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Comments on Research in Political Science 
 Coalition theories within political science add support to the role played by some 
of the variables identified in social psychology. Specifically, these variables including 
reward maximization (or at least attainment), size (minimization and non-minimization) 
and ideology, may play a role in the formation of organizational coalitions. Indeed, the 
fact that these variables have been identified in both literatures suggests they are, at 
least, worth consideration in future research. For example, it is widely assumed within 
the political science research that actors make coalition decisions based on a 
maximization principle (reward maximization). However, the reward is often binary (win – 
lose) political utility rather than the more tangible rewards specified within social 
psychology (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). 
 As with the research within social psychology, coalition research within political 
science relies heavily on assumptions that require caution in applying the findings to 
organizational coalitions. These include the assumption that actors are completely 
rational (following a single known objective), games are zero-sum, players have perfect 
information regarding the conditions, options (moves) and ideologies for any player, and 
that only winning coalitions have value and members receive only positive payoffs 
(DeSwaan, 1970, 1973; De Winter, et al., 2002; Riker, 1962; van Beest, 2002). 
 Another concern with political science theories is that they may be limited in 
explaining formation of organizational coalitions since they tend to focus on the ability of 
a coalition to implement its objectives following successful formation (Murnighan, 1978). 
Also, coalition theories tend to emphasize public policy issues that, by nature, are supra-
organizational and rarely focus on personnel selection (Andeweg, 2000; Murnighan, 
1978). 
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 However, an even more serious issue is that these theories may be tautological, 
since they have been evaluated primarily with the same data used to formulate the 
models. In fact, a general criticism is that political scientists tend to engage in 
explanations of previous (or existing) coalitions rather than prediction (Murnighan, 1978). 
Though this is frequently regarded as a necessity given the long time frame within which 
governmental coalitions evolve, doubts remain regarding the external validity and 
application of these theories. Several researchers (Back & Dumont, 2004; Bennett, 
2002; De Winter, et al, 2002; De Vries, 1999; Martin & Stevenson, 2001) concluded that 
in practice the latest theories do no better than the earlier formulations at predicting the 
composition of real-world governments. These researchers reported similar weaknesses 
and an overall inability of coalitions models to predict governmental outcomes. 
Coalition Research in Organization Studies 
 The coalition concept has been identified in the organization literature for more 
than four decades (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962; March & Simon, 1958; 
Thompson, 1967). In fact, the idea that organizations are comprised of shifting and 
overlapping groups of people having competing and often conflicting goals is the basis 
for the political perspective on organizations (Drory & Romm, 1990; Frost, 1987; 
Morgan, 1986). The subsequent disparities in power depicted in this view are believed to 
be one of the fundamental factors driving coalition formation (Mannix & White, 1992). 
Here, less-powerful actors gain the opportunity to attain more power (influence) through 
concerted action. 
 In somewhat of a departure from traditional views on coalitions, Buchanan and 
Badham (1999) described political behavior and coalition activity as a necessary rather 
than an objectionable dimension of organizational life. In the context of planned change 
programs these researchers reported the need for change agents to utilize ‘powerful 
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coalitions’ to help improve program success rates. Stated differently, these researchers 
suggested not only that political behavior can serve organizational goals, but also that it 
was sometimes a requirement for success. 
 Yet, despite the acceptance of the political perspective there has been a scarcity 
of field research investigating coalitions in functioning organizations. In addition, within 
organization studies the concept of coalitions has been inconsistently applied (Cobb, 
1986). Even in those instances where coalitions are mentioned within organizations they 
typically are secondary considerations in the investigation of other research phenomena 
(Pearce, Stevenson & Porter, 1986). In other words, coalitions are assumed to be 
common organizational phenomena, but their formation and operation is left largely 
unexplained. 
 As mentioned, several organization researchers (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; 
Lawler & Youngs, 1975; Murnighan & Brass, 1991; Thurman, 1979) have commented on 
the importance of structural constraints and similar socio-demographic factors in 
coalition processes. These factors include age, titles, past experiences, friendship, 
ideology, and structural and physical proximity. The role of such similarities in group 
formation has been supported by Blau (1977), McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 
(1992) and Polzer, Mannix and Neale (1998). These researchers reported that most 
social contacts occur between people with some degree of similarity so groups tend to 
demonstrate a relative level of homogeneity. In other words, organization members may 
form coalitions based on some factor similarity such as friendship or office location with 
or without some utility maximizing potential. 
 Fenger and Jean-Klok (2001) reported that the extent and structure of 
relationship interdependencies helped explain the role of single actors in the policy 
changes between advocacy coalitions in and between organizations. Similar beliefs 
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pertaining to policy topics provided for the iterative or sequential policy changes between 
participants. Attention to interdependency contributes significantly to the explanation of 
single behaviors and advocacy coalitions. 
 More recently, research on organizational subcultures has explored the link 
between value similarity within organizational sub-groups and collective action (Adkins & 
Caldwell, 2004). Some scholars (Howard-Greenville, 2006; Swidler, 1986) suggest that 
an organization’s subcultures determine the issues addressed as well as the possible 
strategies for action to be taken. While this work appears to parallel the general 
understanding of coalitions (i.e., informal groups acting in response to an issue), specific 
coalition-focused research in this area has not been undertaken. 
 Finally, some of the work in group negotiation (Bazerman, et. al, 2000; Beersma 
& De Dreu, 1999; Polzer, Mannix & Neale, 1998) describes coalition processes. This 
research frequently employs dyadic and triadic games in a manner similar to game 
experiments. Though, here formation rationales tend to be less reward driven. Instead, 
concepts such as fairness, trust, exclusion, cooperation and social motives are identified 
as part of the negotiation process (Chen, Chen & Meindl, 1998). However, a key 
distinction is that these variables tend to be evaluated after a group is formed, rather 
than a basis for its formation. Another distinction between more specific coalition 
research is that studies here tend to focus on activities (often conflict) in organization-
sanctioned activities, such as work teams and structure (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; 
Georgopoulos, 1986), rather than the informal and unofficial world of coalitions (De 
Dreu, Harinck & Van Vianen, 1999; Kramer, 1991; Saunders, 1985). 
Comments on Research in Organization Studies 
 Coalition research within the field of organization studies is not as plentiful as that 
found in social psychology or political science. While this research base has discussed 
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coalitions within organizational settings, it generally lacks rigor and at times is merely 
anecdotal. In many cases, the term coalition is used to imply a group or subset of 
organization members. Several researchers have suggested an explanation for the 
relatively small amount of coalition research within organization studies. Cobb (1991), 
Pearce et al. (1986) and Stevenson et al. (1985) noted that the study of organizational 
coalitions has been hampered by inconsistent applications of the coalition concept. 
Consequently, various interpretations of coalitions have produced confusion within the 
research. Nevertheless, coalitions generally are believed to be prevalent in the 
organizational world and most likely play significant roles in shaping organizational 
events. 
Summary of the Coalition Literature 
 Taken together, the existing literatures provide some possible components of an 
account of coalition development within organizations. Indeed, several potential 
determinants of coalition formation have been identified. These include reward or payoff 
maximization, power, size, actor resources, ideology, identification with others and 
fairness. 
 However, as noted, the application of laboratory findings directly to organization 
research faces several obstacles. A primary concern is that these experiments neglect 
crucial aspects of organizational context (Komorita & Parks, 1995; Mannix & White, 
1992). For example, physical design of the workplace, access to others and systems, 
organization culture, constraints on behaviors derived from hierarchical positions, the 
diversity of individual resources, and the sanctioning of certain knowledge and skill sets 
make organizations noticeably different from most laboratory settings. 
 Omissions of organizational context are a direct result of laboratory conditions 
and narrow assumptions (game parameters) such as utility maximization, perfect 
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information, unanimous goals, and zero-sum bargaining as the sole means by which 
actors collaborate (Cobb, 1986; DeSwaan, 1985; Miller & Komorita, 1986; van der 
Linden & Verbeek, 1985). This is not to suggest that laboratory experiments can’t 
include contextual variables. Rather, game-based coalition experiments generally have 
not done so. Most researchers probably would agree that organizations are comprised of 
imperfect knowledge, dynamic conditions, historical constraints, unclear boundaries, 
rules, policies, norms, strategies and multiple (and often competing) objectives and 
rationalities. 
 A second concern about applying findings of laboratory research to organizations 
concerns the external validity of work derived from game experiments. Many theories 
and models based on laboratory experiments have had little success in predicting 
coalition processes (Cook & Gilmore, 1984; De Winter, et al., 2002; Mannix & White, 
1992; van Beest, 2002). In other words, coalition theories generally do not perform as 
intended. According to Komorita et al. (1989), most coalition experiments simply suggest 
that players with the greatest resources obtain the greatest payoffs or that some 
allocation norm (e.g., equity and equality) directs payoff distribution. However, these 
(and other) conclusions stem from the types of experimental games employed. As a 
result, the validity of many coalition theories beyond the very narrow scope of a 
particular and unrealistic game is doubtful (Kravitz, 1981; Levine & Morland, 1990; Miller, 
1980). For example, Miller (1980) found that actor resources had no effect on coalition 
formation or payoff distribution in most real world situations while Kravitz (1981) reported 
that resources did have some impact on coalitions. Many of the contradictory outcomes 
found in the literature can be attributed to differences between the types of games and 
their parameters employed for theory development and testing (Levine & Morland, 
1990). As a result, game theoretic approaches to coalitions generally are not useful 
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beyond narrowly specified laboratory experiments (Miller & Komorita, 1986; Murnighan, 
1985). 
 One means of addressing these limitations might be to add contextual factors 
described in organization studies to existing laboratory research. As mentioned, 
contextual factors include organization structure, strategies, rules and policies, 
friendships and even cultural elements such as norms and customs. However, the 
revision of extant theories and the underlying research would be prohibitive (Komorita & 
Parks, 1995). In addition, Cobb (1982) reported that a technical rationality has obscured 
existing coalition theories so greatly that the simple inclusion of more variables in 
laboratory experiments would not benefit organization research. This may help explain 
the near absence of coalition research in organizations over the past two decades. 
According to Komorita and Parks (1995) and van Beest (2004), the decrease in research 
frequency is directly attributable to the inability of extant theories to work in conditions 
that approximate real life situations. 
 Consequently, numerous researchers (Bennett, 2002; De Winter, et al., 2002; 
Gerring, 2004; Karanthanos, 1994; Komorita & Ellis, 1988; Kravitz, 1981; Mannix & 
White, 1992; Murnighan, 1985) have called for new approaches to study coalitions that 
incorporate situational context. In addition, it is believed that coalition theories need to 
adopt a process orientation to highlight the determinants and structure of coalitions and 
how they change over time (Gentry, 1987; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Murnighan, 1978). 
The present research offers an approach for meeting these requests. Specifically, 
structural analysis combined with socio-demographic data is suggested as a suitable 
means for improving the investigation of organizational coalitions. 
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Chapter Three 
Structural Analysis & Coalitions 
 As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, research into organizational coalitions 
has remained under-developed and new approaches to studying coalitions, particularly 
within an organizational context, are needed. Several researchers (Burt, 1976, 1982; 
Hosking & Fineman, 1990) have contended that context in any social system is 
comprised of, and shaped by, ongoing relationships between people. Thus, I suggest 
that the inclusion and investigation of member relationships as a means of assessing 
context may advance the state of the art in organizational coalition research. As such, 
the present research proposes a structural approach for this field of inquiry. The 
following sections provide a definition of coalitions, discuss the central role of 
interactions in our understanding of organizational coalitions and provide social network 
analysis as a useful approach to the study of organizational coalitions. 
Organizational Coalitions Defined 
 Following Stevenson et al. (1985) and Pearce et al. (1986), the present study 
regards an intra-organizational coalition as a purposeful, interacting group of individuals 
that is not identified as part of an organization's formal structure and lacks its own formal 
structure. In addition, members are considered to be generally aware of other members 
(enabling interaction), maintain an issue orientation (focused on objectives external to 
the group), and perceive a need for concerted member action. 
 This definition is suitable to the present study for several reasons. First, it does 
not limit coalition focus strictly to organizational policies or formal decision-making.  
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Rather, it allows that coalitions may operate in formal and informal realms of 
organizations to influence not only decisions, but also less discrete outcomes such as 
the advancement of specific values and agendas (Morgan, 1986). Similarly, this usage 
frees coalition processes from restrictive assumptions such as formation due to utility 
maximization. This does not imply that maximization is not at times a reason for 
formation, but emphasizes that the process is open to a variety of determinants. 
 Second, this definition highlights the action characteristic of coalitions. This 
emphasis is useful since coalitions are considered to be distinct from other groups of 
actors, such as cliques and formal organizational units, due to their involvement in 
mutual undertakings of some form of unsanctioned (unofficial) action (Cobb, 1986; 
Stevenson et al., 1985). Such action typically involves the planning and execution of 
influence attempts on individuals, processes, or events external to the coalition. Most 
importantly, these actions are undertaken in concert. Whether coalition activities are 
planned through various forms of exchange or actually implemented by members they 
are usually the result of collaboration (requiring interaction). In addition, since coalitions 
are issue-oriented it is possible to have multiple coalitions with overlapping 
memberships. 
 Third, this definition provides for a means of addressing issues of member 
awareness within the coalition. This includes awareness of the group in terms of its 
objectives as well as awareness of other members. Such awareness guides the 
interaction (exchange, collaboration, etc.) among members regarding the discussion and 
implementation of influencing activities. Therefore, members must at least be generally 
aware of other members. This does not mean all members must know of and interact 
with every other member. It simply is intended to exclude individuals who independently 
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desire the same action as the coalition but do not collaborate with others on influencing 
attempts. 
Structure, Interactions and Coalitions 
 Interactions among people are important to coalition research and the present 
study for several reasons. First, repeated or patterned interactions help identify 
organization and sub-unit (e.g., coalition) structure. According to DiMaggio (1992) and 
Smelser (1988), relationship structure constitutes and helps us explain the very qualities 
of social systems under investigation. In addition, Mannix and White (1992) reported that 
coalition activity within organizations long has been associated with the concept of 
power. Indeed, organizational power has been described, in part, as a structural 
phenomenon (Brass, 1992; Fombrun, 1983). Thus, interactions represent a versatile unit 
of analysis for the study of social systems. A focus on interactions may better enable the 
identification, measurement, and comparison of coalitions and their surrounding 
organization structures. 
 Second, some form of member interaction typically is either specifically identified 
or implied in nearly all uses of the coalition concept. For example, as described earlier, 
the extant literature assumes interactions as the means to facilitate the bargaining that 
must occur between game participants to exchange offers, counter-offers and distribute 
rewards. Other research (e.g., Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) suggests coalition 
interaction may be based on more socially derived, or less tangible, exchanges between 
people. However, this too assumes a key role for interactions. In other words, people 
independently pursuing similar objectives (as isolates) do not represent the basic 
concept of coalitions. Concerted interaction drives the process of collaboration that 
defines these groups (Cobb, 1986). 
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 Third, some research (Casciaro, 1998; Stevenson et al., 1985) suggests 
interactions are important to coalition formation because they enable the shared 
perception of issues and ideas that may serve as a focal point of collaborative activity. 
Thus, these researchers hypothesize that coalitions are more likely to form in conditions 
where member interaction is possible. Indeed, an actor's willingness to cooperate or 
participate in a coalition may depend on his or her identification with other actors with 
whom they are interdependent (Kramer, 1993). Such positive identification may be made 
possible through the exchange of salient social information through interactions (Friedkin 
& Johnsen, 1999; Marsden & Friedkin, 1994; Rice & Aydin, 1991; Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978). As stated by Bazerman (1985) and Mannix and White (1992), actions and 
perceptions are mediated by the social context within which relationships are embedded. 
This is similar to and supported by the work on subcultures where value congruence 
leads to similar interpretations of events and actions (Saffold, 1988; Trice, 1993) Thus, 
the study of interactions provides an opportunity to better understand both the 
organizational context within which coalitions exist as well as the individual links that 
may explain coalition formation. 
Social Network Analysis 
 Structural analysis, or social network analysis (SNA), is a suitable method for 
investigating coalition interactions. SNA is an approach rooted in anthropology, 
sociology and social psychology for assessing social structures (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; 
Tichy & Fombrun, 1979). The social network perspective frames social systems as 
networks of objects or positions joined by various relationships (Brass, 1984; Lincoln, 
1982; Nohria, 1992). Social network analysis is concerned with the structure and 
patterning of relationships and seeks to identify both their causes and consequences 
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Burt, 1992; Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1979). This view is 
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consistent with Weick's (1979) notion that organizations consist of patterned, repeated 
interactions among social actors. 
 Within the social network perspective, organizations are considered to be social 
spaces where one’s position relative to others can be measured by social-psychological 
and demographic data. Location and connection to others within this space provides 
meaning and a means for member and group identification. Indeed, a person’s 
perceived position is instrumental in determining his or her beliefs, interests and 
motivation for action (Blackburn & Cummings, 1982; Burt, 1982, 1992; Carley, 1991; 
Carley & Krackhardt, 1996; Reis & Collins, 2004). Thus, people in extreme or distant 
network positions have different interpretations of the organizational environment than 
their more central counterparts (Casciaro, 1998; Erickson, 1988; Krackhardt, 1990; 
McPherson, et al., 1992). Likewise, people in positions of close proximity (e.g., having 
strong ties) tend to maintain similar interpretations of the organizational environment 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Burt, 1976) and may act similarly (e.g., form a coalition). This 
condition quite likely results from different roles and the probable dissimilar flows of 
social information and the tendency for people to seek out similar others (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995; Blackburn and Cummings, 1982). 
 The social network perspective has supported an increasing volume of work 
within the field of organization studies (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). This includes research 
on social capital (Burt, 1992; Putnam, 2000; Walker, Wasserman & Wellman, 1994), 
economic embeddedness (DiMaggio & Louch, 1998; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002), network 
organizations (Miles & Snow, 1992; Rice & Gattiker, 2000), organizational alliances 
(Baum & Calabrese, 2000; Oliver, 2001), organizational learning (Brown & Duguid, 
2000; Friedkin & Johnsen, 1999), social cognition (Baron & Markman, 2003; Carley & 
Krackhardt, 1996), and group influence (Carley, 1991; Kiesler & Cummings, 2002) to 
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name a few. 
 Social network analysis aids the investigation of organizational coalitions by 
focusing on the interaction patterns that are central to the coalition concept and the 
understanding of social structures. A key understanding within the SNA perspective is 
that myriad networks exist within a social system by which small-scale interactions 
become translated into large-scale patterns, which in turn, direct the activities of 
individual actors and groups (Granovetter, 1973). Thus, even seemingly insignificant 
actions can alter the interpretive and behavioral landscape of organizations (Knoke & 
Kuklinski, 1982; Krackhardt & Porter, 1986; Granovetter, 1973). 
Chapter Summary 
 Investigating interactions is important for understanding coalitions because 
interactions help to define and identify these groups. In addition, the investigation of 
interactions may provide a better understanding of social systems such as organizations 
because interactions help to define structure and context. To be sure, network theorists 
(Burt, 1982; Erickson, 1988; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Krackhardt, 1987; White, 1992) 
contend that social context (rules, constraints, beliefs, norms, experiences, etc.) is 
understood and captured best by structural investigations. Since structural analytic 
methodologies specifically focus on interaction data they provide for an ideal means of 
deeper inquiry into organizations and coalitions (Cobb, 1986; Knoke, 1990; Murnighan & 
Brass, 1991; Nohria, 1992; Thurman, 1979; Wellman, 1988). 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methods 
 Even though coalitions are known to be common in modern organizations, there 
is little empirical knowledge about how they develop. The present research addresses 
this lacuna and in doing so provides the foundation for future investigations by helping to 
explain the nature of coalition formation processes within organizations. To do so, this 
study investigated developing coalitions within their surrounding social systems. As 
reported, such organizational context is believed to be important to the advancement of 
this area of research. In this section I describe the methods used to conduct this study. 
Research Design 
 The present research employed an exploratory case study design. This approach 
was chosen for two reasons. First, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, the current 
state of the coalition literature does not provide satisfactory evidence for its application to 
organizations. To reiterate, the validity of coalition research is affected significantly by 
contextual factors (e.g., structure, friendships, demographics, rules and policies, norms), 
but such factors have not been sufficiently incorporated into coalition research (Levine & 
Morland, 1990; Mannix & White, 1992; Polzer, et al., 1998). 
 Second, a primary advantage of an exploratory design is that it remains open to 
various interpretations of events. In the present study, this means that none of the 
previous explanations of coalition activity (e.g., maximization) are favored initially. While 
several ideas can be found in the extant literature, given the limitations described earlier, 
a more open approach seems appropriate. In other words, this design provides for the 
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possibility that organizational coalition processes may or may not be guided by factors 
identified in the existing research. 
 Investigating coalitions in an organization offers the opportunity to clarify existing 
ideas while providing a foundation for a more thorough or complete research program. A 
primary goal of the present research was to develop inferences, or sound explanations 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Yin, 1994), based on the 
records of evidence made possible by the use of multiple data sources. 
 Several researchers (Bennett, 2002; Gerring, 2004) have suggested that the use 
of case studies in coalition research would be a powerful means for identifying new or 
omitted variables that may, in turn, lead to more complete investigations of coalition 
dynamics. Similarly, De Winter, et al. (2002), argued that the use of case studies in 
coalition research would provide the inductive rigor needed for advances in meaningful 
theory formulation. 
Research Instruments and Data 
 As indicated, the present research used several forms of data to try to better 
reflect the organizational and contextual factors that may influence organizational 
coalitions. These factors included work and social interaction patterns, perceptions of 
influence, belief systems, and demographic data such as age, gender, tenure, 
education, work experience as well as organizational history. The instruments used to 
collect these data included interviews, network measures and value surveys. 
 Semi-structured interviews.  Researchers (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 
2000; Reis & Collins, 2004) within organization studies have suggested that coalition 
formation may be based on some level of member similarity such as age, gender, 
friendships, or educational background. The more similar an individual is to other group 
members on a given demographic characteristic, the more likely they are to engage in 
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cooperation. This occurs not only because people are attracted to those who are similar 
to them (due to minimization of perceived relationship conflict), but also because they 
assume that people like them share their same values and worldview (McPherson et al., 
2001). Brewer (1981) even reported that people with similar demographic factors tend to 
perceive each other as more trustworthy. Such data are instrumental in any attempted 
understanding of organizational coalitions and the chance that they may be based on 
socio-demographic factors. 
 Semi-structured interviews (appendix A) were used to gather data on 
organization member demographics, backgrounds, interpretations of influential of 
powerful others, important issues, coalition activity and coalition rationales. The 
questions were grouped into categories intended to move the subject effectively from 
simple responses (producing a non-threatening environment) to more involved answers. 
Interviews were the primary means of data used to assess similarities across the 
research population and coalitions. 
Network self-report instruments. As mentioned, relationships help define context 
within social systems. The network perspective holds that interpretations of events as 
well as opportunities and constraints on action are related to relative network position. In 
other words, similar (or close) network position may impact perceptions (or vice versa) 
that lead to actions such as coalition formation (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Burt, 1982; 
Casciaro, 1998; Erickson, 1988; Krackhardt, 1990). 
Interaction or network data were captured using network self-report instruments 
(appendix B). Network self-report instruments are the most common method of network 
data collection and they have been proven reliable in describing overall patterns of 
relations (Berg, 1995; Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982). These instruments simply are 
organization rosters each member can use to indicate whether he or she has a particular 
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relationship with others in the organization. Researchers (Freeman, Romney & 
Freeman, 1987; Krackhardt, 1990) have reported that people are accurate at recalling 
enduring patterns of relations they have with others. While they might not remember 
whom they connected with on a given day, people tend to describe their overall patterns 
of relations reliably. Forms of interaction among coalition members include face-to-face 
communication, telephone conversations, voice and electronic mail, as well as written 
notes and memoranda. Such interactions may take place within and/or outside an 
organization's boundaries. 
Rokeach Value Survey. Values-based data were used as a proxy for member 
ideologies or belief systems. As previously mentioned, coalition research within the 
political science literature has identified ideology as a variable in coalition processes. 
Typically, belief systems, value systems, world-views, and ideologies have been treated 
synonymously (Eagleton, 1991; Gross, 1985) and refer to the personal and social 
mechanisms for interpreting, understanding, and reacting to one's surroundings 
(Buchholz, 1976, 1978; Goll & Zeitz, 1991; Ibrahim & Kahn, 1988; Sproull, 1981; Withers 
& Wantz, 1993). Because values are a guide for behavioral choices, group members 
who share similar values are more likely to agree about group actions such as goals, 
tasks, and procedures (Jehn, 1994; 1995). Ancona (1990) also reported that similarity in 
values resulted in higher identification between group members. 
Values have been used as a substitute for measuring ideology and worldviews 
because they are core determinants of human behavior (Beyer, Dunbar & Meyer, 1988; 
Ovadia, 2004; Rokeach, 1973). Significant correlations have been found between values 
and numerous individual and group behaviors reflected in belief systems (Crosby, Bitner 
& Gill, 1990; Kagan, 1986; Thomas, 1986). 
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The Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973), or RVS, is a widely used value 
measurement scale (Kamakura & Mazzon, 1991; Mueller & Wornhoff, 1990; Ovadia, 
2004). The RVS (appendix C) assesses eighteen instrumental values and eighteen 
terminal values. In effect, instrumental values reflect desirable means or modes of 
conduct, and terminal values reflect desirable end-states. According to Crosby et al. 
(1990), the distinction between means values and ends values is appropriate in values-
based research. 
Reliability measures for the ranking version of the RVS have been reported 
according to each segment (instrumental and terminal). Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 
1989) found the terminal values segment of the survey had test-retest reliability scores 
ranging from .51 to .88 and instrumental test-retest values ranging from .45 to .70. 
Braithwaite and Law (1985) reported the RVS had demonstrated good reliability over 
time (i.e. r = .88 to .51 for the terminal values; r = .70 to .45 for the instrumental values) 
and sound validity when compared to other value scales. Mueller and Wornhoff (1990) 
stated that the RVS was an overall reliable instrument, but that the terminal segment 
tended to demonstrate higher reliability (i.e., r = .78 to .80). Several researchers 
(Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Miethe, 1985; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987) found the psychometric properties of the original ranking version to be 
satisfactory and a statistically sound and useful instrument for measuring human values. 
I employed the ranking version of the RVS. 
 Despite its widespread use, there have been critiques of the RVS that are 
relevant to most ranking systems. First, time demands placed on both the respondent 
and the researcher makes it difficult to administer. Second, ranking yields a data set that 
cannot be analyzed with standard statistical methods because of the interdependence of 
the ranked (ordinal) data (Ovadia, 2004). Third, ranking or prioritizing lengthy lists can be 
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somewhat difficult and require significant concentration by participants increasing the 
chance for respondent error (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985). 
Yet, the primary alternative to ranking, value rating, also has been criticized. 
Here, the primary concerns are that since ratings require less effort the quality of the 
data may be reduced and that rating makes it more likely that response biases, such as 
social desirability and concentration around the mean, will occur (Alwin & Krosnick, 
1985). Thus, each value response form requires sacrifices in the research application. 
 It is possible to try to group or aggregate RVS scores into clusters such as those 
pertaining to personal, social or even moral value ‘domains’ or sub-scales. However, it 
has been reported (Kelly & Strupp, 1992) that the theoretical distinctions between such 
domains have received scarce empirical confirmation and lack the specificity that is 
necessary to draw meaningful conclusions from results. Likewise, Braithwaite and Law 
(1985) questioned the classification or identification of a value set based on a single 
aggregated measure. These researchers argued that multiple value scores (e.g., 36 in 
the RVS) portray a more realistic view of a person’s value system. 
 The RVS, as with all ranking systems, results in a list of values in a zero-sum 
structure by definition. For example, if the position of one value increases by one rank, 
another value must decline by one rank. Rokeach (1973) argued that while all values are 
considered to be important when thought of independently, activating a value in a 
behavioral situation requires relative evaluations of certain values against one another. 
According to Ovadia (2004), values represent mutually exclusive choices. In situations 
that call multiple values into possible action, one must be prioritized over the other(s). 
This means that as value structures change over time or differ across groups, the higher 
importance of one value must come at the expense of the importance of another value. 
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 Conceptually, the procedure of ranking values is consistent with the idea that 
individual values are comparative and competitive (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985; Kamakura & 
Mazzon, 1991). In other words, since our own value systems are comprised of 
hierarchically arranged values it seems appropriate to measure values in a manner that 
reflects the inherent strength (relative rank) of individuals’ values. 
Pilot Research 
 According to Yin (1994), an effective method of verifying construct validity in case 
study research is to evaluate the instruments pertaining to the constructs to eliminate, or 
at least reduce, subjectivity in the measures. The instruments described above were 
administered to a pilot study group prior to application in the present research. The pilot 
study took place in an information systems department at a large university located in 
the southeast United States. The pilot study included 12 participants. 
 All pilot subjects reported that they understood the RVS and network instruments 
and that they agreed with the data the instruments intended to capture. However, one 
participant mentioned that the network self-report instrument might be clearer if written 
examples of various types (levels) of interactions were provided. When asked about this, 
all other subjects preferred the network self-report instrument scales (based on 
frequency) to those based on examples describing the interactions desired. Pilot 
subjects agreed that interaction descriptions would be too confusing and incapable of 
distinguishing clearly between multiple types of relationships. In addition, several 
respondents suggested including a scale value indicating interactions occurring less 
than once per week. This change was included in the final versions of the network self-
report instruments. 
 Finally, all pilot subjects reported clear understanding of the interview questions, 
though five people (42%) recommended that the term ‘coalition’ be included in the 
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question referring to contact from others (number 20, appendix A). However, pilot 
members indicated that adequate understanding was attained, so it was reasoned that 
potential increases in understanding were not worth potential increases in the risk of 
bias. 
 After analysis of the pilot data, two questions were omitted and one question was 
added to the final question list. Concerning background information, pilot subjects were 
asked, “Do you do anything outside of work with any current members of (company)?” 
This question did not yield data that differed than those produced with the social self-
report instrument and was subsequently removed from the question list. In regards to the 
perceptions of powerful others, subjects were asked, “Can you recall an example of 
when he/she used his/her influence or power?” This question generally was answered, 
“constantly” or “all the time” and also was omitted. The background question, "Do you 
think your actions make a difference in the world?" was added. The final interview 
questions were reviewed for their appropriateness by the faculty chair of my dissertation 
committee. The interview schedule then was tested on four non-participants to further 
assess question clarity and to gain feedback on making question delivery as natural as 
possible. 
Research Setting 
 Research site selection had to address several important issues. As mentioned, 
one problem with previous coalition research has been the lack of organizational 
context. A second issue has been the difficulty in identifying coalitions in organizations 
(Cobb, 1991; Stevenson et al., 1985). Thus, two key factors in selecting a site were: 1) 
the potential it affords for identifying coalition activity within the target organization, and 
2) the completeness with which coalition data could be gathered. In addition, I believed 
that an organization that didn't prohibit coalition development through controlled (i.e., 
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highly formalized) interactions was desirable. So, the site needed to be an organization 
that would be large and organic enough to foster coalition activity and small enough to 
enable thorough investigation of potentially numerous drivers of coalition behavior. This 
included access to the organization's members, history and systems (policies, 
processes) as well as opportunities to explore potential determining factors. 
 A software development organization located in the southeast United States was 
selected for the present research. Software, Inc. (all names in this research are 
pseudonyms) was an operating unit of Parent Company, a multi-billion dollar financial 
services firm. Parent provided a variety of financial services through its consumer 
finance, credit card, banking and insurance operations. At the time data were collected, 
the organization was comprised of more than 1,000 field offices located throughout the 
U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany. Software had 29 members 
who were responsible for developing, maintaining and supporting business application 
software for a variety of Parent's internal operations. 
 Software satisfied the selection criteria described above because relatively few 
barriers to member interactions existed. Managers, developers, contractors, and interns 
operated in a flexible team environment and were expected to interact (exchange 
information, provide support, build friendships, etc.) between project groups and provide 
assistance to others in an informal manner. Thus, it was possible for a range of 
relationships, from those based strictly on work to those based strictly on social ties, to 
exist in the organization. It was believed that such an environment would provide 
opportunities for the variety of formation determinants mentioned in the coalition 
literature to occur. Also, the company's size allowed me to become more familiar with 
organization members, policies and processes. This was beneficial to more completely 
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understanding the sources of coalition relationships and their association to the overall 
structure of the firm. 
 Software's small size reduced the logistical difficulties of conducting complete 
interviews and in-depth observations. In addition, the firm's size enabled use of network 
data sets taken from the entire population of interest (the organization). This is regarded 
as the best way to avoid problems associated with network sampling techniques (Knoke 
& Kuklinski, 1982; Scott, 1991). 
Research Protocols 
The participants in this research were not notified of its focus on coalition activity. 
Instead, they were informed (appendix D) that the study intended to explore 
organizational decision-making. This enabled a truthful representation of the work to be 
accomplished while protecting against potential bias and contamination. Every 
organization member was notified that any and all data provided during the study would 
be kept securely and in confidence. 
 To gain a better understanding of Software’s context, its history was compiled 
from formal documents (mission statements, planning documents, etc.) and 
conversations with organization members. The events reported were then condensed 
into a summary account. Software managers and those personnel with the longest 
tenure verbally verified the accuracy of this account. 
Field notes were maintained during every site visit for the course of this research, 
which lasted more than eleven weeks. Following Berg (1995), informal interviews 
(discussions) were used initially to build rapport with organization members, learn about 
the organization and its operations, and aid the interpretation and integration of various 
data sources. 
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The delivery and collection of the Rokeach Value Survey and network self-report 
instruments followed the same procedure. I placed the instruments, instructions and 
unmarked response envelope in each organization member’s mailbox. Delivery was 
followed by an electronic mail reminder message sent to all members. The instructions 
directed subjects to seal their responses in the unmarked envelopes for deposit in a 
larger manila envelope marked ‘COBA Research’ affixed to a filing cabinet in a centrally 
located area. 
 Data from the Rokeach Value Survey were recorded on a personal computer 
using an electronic spreadsheet software application for tabulation.  After all respondent 
data were coded a printout was generated to check the coded data against each 
subject’s response page. Also, each respondent's scores were rechecked on the 
computer to verify that each rank level (1-18) was used only once. Two data entry errors 
were found and corrected. 
 Network data also were checked for errors. The responses for all subjects were 
coded on a personal computer using a word processing software application. A 27-
person by 27-person interaction matrix (appendix E) was created for each data set. 
When completed, a printout was used to check each of the 729 matrix cells against the 
actual instruments for accuracy. Four data entry errors were found and corrected. Then, 
the word processing files were imported into a network analysis software application. 
Each matrix was rechecked against the original network instruments to make sure no 
errors occurred during file conversion. No errors were found. 
 The time periods between the distribution of the Rokeach Value Survey, work 
self-report instrument and social self-report instrument increased the likelihood of 
accurate responses for each instrument. One-on-one interviews with each participant 
followed collection of the survey data. The interviews took place in a private conference 
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facility located on premise. Notes for each interview were taken on printed questionnaire 
sheets with ample space for note taking. This circumvented the need to shuffle between 
pages during the interview.  Immediately following each interview session, notes were 
reviewed and corrected. All notes were rewritten and stored on a personal computer 
using a word processing software application the same day the interview took place (all 
before 6:00pm). 
 The interviews were not tape recorded for two reasons. First, during the pilot 
study several subjects demonstrated apprehension and voiced concern regarding the 
taping of interviews. While they seemed to be free with their comments when their words 
were being written, a tape recorder drew too much attention and made some subjects 
uncomfortable. Taping was discontinued during the pilot. In addition, it was learned that 
the note taking procedures worked adequately. Second, since several subjects 
expressed concern for their anonymity during the value survey phase of the present 
study I decided that recorded interview sessions would not be requested. 
Data Collection 
Data for this research were collected in three phases. Phase one was the 
collection of survey data. This included distribution of the Rokeach Value Survey to 
assess organization members’ value systems and the generation of network data sets. It 
also included reviews of organizational policies, workflows, and operating structure. 
Phase two consisted of semi-structured interviews to gather additional socio-
demographic data. Key objectives here were to ascertain members’ perceptions of 
influential others in the organization, and their reasons for perceiving them to be 
influential. Also, the identification of potentially important (or volatile, controversial, etc.) 
issues occurred in this phase. Phase three consisted of using responses provided in 
phase two to identify potential coalition members and their interactions with others. 
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As shown in Table 1 (below), the first step of this study consisted of the 
distribution of an introduction memorandum (appendix D) to the 29 members of the 
organization. 
Table 1 
Schedule of Research Activity 
 
Day Activity 
1 Distributed introduction memos 
10 Distributed Rokeach Value Surveys 
16 Began collecting Rokeach Value Surveys 
21 Collected last Rokeach Value Survey 
29 Distributed work self-report instruments 
32 Began collecting work self-report instruments 
37 Collected last work self-report instrument 
42 Distributed social self-report instruments 
45 Began collecting social self-report instruments 
49 Collected last social self-report instrument 
50 Began interviews 
63 Completed interviews 
64 Began coalition identification 
77 Completed data collection 
 
Nine days after distributing the introductory memo the Rokeach Value Survey 
was distributed to all organization members. Four subjects required additional 
clarification that involved direct conversations. It was learned that these people were 
concerned with their possible identification (to management) in subsequent reports 
associated with the study. Their fears were adequately addressed with assurances that 
confidentiality would be maintained and that data indicating identities would be 
destroyed after coding or completion of the study. Only two people chose not to 
participate in the research. 
Within 11 days, 27 members (93.1%) completed and returned the Rokeach 
Value Survey. This group of respondents became the research population. Eight days 
after the last value survey was collected the work network self-report instrument was 
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distributed. Twenty-seven self-report instruments were collected within eight days. Only 
two subjects needed prodding and this was accomplished using verbal reminders. After 
five days the social (non-work) network self-report instruments were distributed. The 
same collection procedures produced 27 responses within seven days. Only one subject 
required verbal reminders. 
 Semi-structured interviews (appendix A) began the day after network data 
gathering had been completed. Interview length ranged from 21 to 47 minutes with an 
average of 30.93 minutes. As is typical in this type of interviewing (Berg, 1995), 
information that was not expected but appeared relevant to the research was pursued. 
Data Analysis 
 The general strategy for data analysis followed several steps. First, interview 
data were analyzed to identify potential starting points for the identification of coalition 
activity. This included members with perceived influence as well as possible issues likely 
to result in coalition activity. Second, attribute data (values, roles, work assignment, 
demographics, etc.) were used to help build profiles of participants and non-participants 
in coalition activity. Third, network analytic data were used to investigate the structures 
or relationships between and among coalition participants and non-participants. An 
underlying question of this research was to determine whether associations (between 
values, relationships, backgrounds, etc.) could be found among the data pertaining to 
individuals who participated in coalitions. 
 Attribute data were assessed mainly through value comparison. Data analysis for 
the Rokeach Value Survey consisted primarily of order (rank) comparisons and means 
analysis. Relationships among individual values for coalition members and non-
members were investigated. Since these were small population measures inferential 
statistics were not required. 
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 Analysis of network data required the identification of organizational and coalition 
structures (sub-sets) and their comparison to other groups including other coalitions and 
non-participants. In SNA, network diagrams are graphical depictions or maps of an 
actor’s relative position, or linkage, to other actors. In the present study, networks were 
created for work-based and social (non-work) interactions using observation, interview 
and self-report data. Again, actor names are pseudonyms and in some cases, 
particularly in network diagrams, only the first initial of the artificial name is used. 
 Numerous measures (mathematical algorithms) are available within SNA to help 
analyze networks at various levels of analyses -- individual actors or positions, sub-
groups, and the entire network. For this research, position-level analyses included 
measures of centrality, frequency and relationship similarity (equivalence). Degree 
centrality assesses each actor’s direct links to (out-degree) and from (in-degree) every 
other actor. It is a relative measure of how connected an actor is to others in a network 
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). 
 Relationship frequency was assessed using N-clan analysis. N-clan analysis 
clusters actors into groups where each member is connected to each other by no more 
than N relationships (where N is a researcher-selected value). For example, a 2-clan is a 
group where each member can be linked to every other member through no more than 
two relationships (links). While this analysis frequently is used for assessing sub-groups, 
in this study the raw cluster data were used to generate frequency data for each actor 
(i.e., the number of times identified in a cluster). Results provide a measure of an actor’s 
potential connectedness. These data were used to further assess actor connectedness 
and also provide a measure of potential influence (Borgatti, et al., 2002). 
 Measures of relationship similarity, or equivalence, indicate the degree to which 
network actors have similar relationships with others. True structurally equivalent actors 
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have identical relationships to the same other actors in a network. In other words, 
structurally equivalent actors are perceived to be completely substitutable (Burt, 1976).  
Regular equivalence is a less stringent measure of similarity. Regularly equivalent actors 
have similar relationships with similar others in the network (Scott, 1991). Regularly 
equivalent actors are perceived to have the same role (rather than the same exact 
position) in a network. 
 Subgroup analyses included measures of importance (lambda analysis) and 
network correlation using the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP). Lambda analysis 
assesses relationship ‘transaction’ and the likelihood for network disruption, or impact on 
others (hence importance), if relationships were removed. Where centrality measures 
focus on an individual actor’s direct relationships with others, lambda analysis considers 
the role of actors in more complex interactions, and more specifically, their aggregated 
impact on the network. Network correlation simply compares the interactions of one 
group of actors to those of another group. 
 Network-wide measures included density and centralization. Network density 
refers to the percentage of ties (relationships) that exist among a group of actors to the 
total number of ties that are possible (Scott, 1991). Network centralization is the extent 
(expressed as a percentage) to which a network’s relationships are concentrated around 
a cohesive center. Here, center does not refer the middle of a diagram because there 
are numerous graphical depictions for any network data set. Rather it refers to actors, or 
in large data sets, groups of actors that may represent high percentages of the overall 
network’s links (regardless of their location in a diagram). 
As previously mentioned, data for the network measures were based on five 
point scales (for work and social sets) to indicate relationship frequency between actor 
pairs. However, some network measures require binary data. Binary data use a value of 
 43
one to indicate a relationship (or link) exists between actors and a value of zero to 
indicate no such relationship. In such cases, research strategies provide options for the 
conversion of network datasets. For example, assuming data on a five-point scale, a 
researcher may decide to analyze all interaction values greater than two (some measure 
of frequency). Here, data values of three, four, and five would be converted to the value 
of one and all others treated as zero (no relationships). This procedure yields what is 
known as a dichotomized dataset. 
Direct causality between variables is not testable (verifiable) in case study 
research and generally is not undertaken. Similarly, standard tests of significance and 
methods of inference are not appropriate. Developing strong evidence chains among 
multiple data sources provides the methods by which inferences can be made with 
sufficient validity and reliability (Yin, 1994). 
 To reiterate, this research used several forms of data to assess associations 
among organization members and their structural positions in an attempt to explore 
intra-organizational coalitions. It was believed that such associations coupled with social 
network analytic techniques would demonstrate a new approach to understanding both 
the contextual environment within which organizational coalitions exist and the actual 
coalition groups (as organization sub-structures). 
 44
  
 
Chapter Five 
Results 
The purpose of this research was to explore how intra-organizational coalitions 
form. It was expected that key elements in the formation process would consist of 
demographic characteristics, personal beliefs (values), structural position and specific 
issues in the organization. Following the procedures described in the previous chapter, 
two coalitions were found. Each group formed as a belief-based response to a common 
issue. Members of Coalition 1 preferred a change to a more traditional and limited 
approach to the idea of teams closely linked to boundaries of the organization’s project-
oriented work activities. Members of Coalition 2 hoped to perpetuate a broad, integrated 
view of team-based work and governance. This view was consistent to the original 
design objectives of the organization, but in its current form was perceived to be 
detrimental to organization performance. These coalitions and the supporting data are 
described in the remainder of this chapter. However, before proceeding the 
organizational context in which these developments took place needs to be described. 
Organizational Background 
 As previously indicated, Software, Inc. was an operating unit of Parent Company 
and was formed at the end of 1994. Parent had a reputation of being conservative and 
highly bureaucratic. According to Software’s president and managers (known as group 
leaders), the decision to locate Software in the southeast U.S., far from the 
organization's northeast U.S. headquarters, was guided by a desire to create a “Different 
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kind of organization”, free of the difficulties that had become associated with Parent's 
rigid corporate bureaucracy. 
 Software's mission statement specifically called for the creation of an 
organization and culture that facilitated high levels of skill in all areas of software 
development. In the words of one group leader, "The purpose of this company is to 
develop systems and to create a new culture,” and “We want development to be quicker, 
better, cheaper, which is just the opposite of [other Parent units]."  One of the primary 
alternatives to traditional business practices that Software was chartered to explore was 
the use of flexible work teams within an extremely flat structure consisting only of group 
leaders (managers) and system developers (known as team members). 
 The creation of Software (six years in planning) almost immediately produced 
problems in its relationships with other organizational units. Software's growth in 
personnel and associated resources was intended to be through the planned attrition of 
other corporate information technology units (of which there were several). In other 
words, Software’s success most likely would be accompanied by reductions of personnel 
and operating budget at other IT groups within Parent. 
Early after its formation, the president and four group leaders of Software noted 
that the political struggle for power between technical units across Parent was the 
primary threat to the new organization’s success. It frequently was mentioned that 
organizational power was related directly to the accumulation of headcount and the 
“automatic allocation” of financial resources attributed to each IT employee. Thus, as 
one respondent observed, as technology groups within Parent “Grow in size they get 
more resources, get handed more development work and add more headcount.”  For 
this reason, the group leaders viewed effectively increasing the number of workers within 
Software as a key business objective. 
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 Many team members, even though some had little or no history with the 
organization, regarded Parent as "Big Brother". Remaining unique (i.e., flat, flexible and 
informal) compared to the reputation of Parent was viewed by group leaders and team 
members alike as a measure of success about equal in importance to more common 
performance measures such as project time, cost and work schedules. As one group 
leader said, "If we get pulled back into the corporate structure we've failed."  System 
development based on self-directed work teams was viewed as high-risk since all of 
Parent’s other units historically had relied on hierarchical project management and 
control. 
 Software's original structure (Figure 1, below) was intended simply to consist of 
flexible project teams interacting with a core management team. The organization 
started with five members on the management team (four group leaders and the 
president) and seven team members split into two project teams.  As originally planned, 
each project team would be assigned a group leader who would be the link between the 
two hierarchical levels. In addition, each team had a member designated team leader to 
help direct the work within the group. 
It was envisioned that teams would be broken down and members reassigned as 
various projects began or ended and as resource requirements shifted. While group 
leaders could be assigned to more than one project, team members and team leaders 
would work only on one project at a time. Also, a team leader on one project would not 
automatically be designated the same role on subsequent projects. It was believed this 
structure could effectively coordinate more than 100 team members and their projects. 
Group leaders were meant to handle day-to-day planning and administrative tasks as 
well as high-level project management. 
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Figure 1 
Software, Inc. Structure 
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Even Software’s office space was designed to support the loose structure of the 
organization. The entire space basically was a large, open room.  Each person worked 
at a self-contained, ergonomic workstation that could be moved and connected into 
larger work areas or clusters as needed. The only exceptions to the workstations were 
more enclosed, four-wall pens for the president and group leaders. In addition, there was 
a more traditional conference room at one end of the main workspace and a 
kitchen/lunch room at the other. 
 Two years after its formation, Software had undergone several changes.  Only 
one of the original group leaders had maintained the same position. One group leader 
had been terminated, one resigned from the organization, and one had been demoted to 
team member status. In addition, one of the original team members had been promoted 
to group leader. Software’s president was terminated for the poor development record of 
the group and an interim president from another Parent technology unit had been 
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installed until a permanent replacement could be found. These changes generally were 
in response to Software's lackluster performance. Since its inception, most of Software’s 
projects were poorly managed, missing time, budget and quality objectives (more than 
80% of combined project milestones). According to one team member, “The projects are 
behind due to all the thrashing” which meant a lack of focus, or that too many people 
were talking about problems and not enough were doing anything to solve them. 
 Most organization members agreed that the main impediment to successful 
operation was a general misunderstanding of the team concept. To some, this idea 
meant equal involvement in all organizational issues, including those considered outside 
the domain of system development. To others, the team idea was nothing more than a 
work group designation. Even Software’s group leaders couldn't agree on team 
definitions and the roles and responsibilities necessary for effective team-based work. 
As one group leader mentioned, “We have plenty of direction, we just need to pick one.” 
Descriptive Statistics 
 To reiterate, the organization (research population) consisted of a president and 
two group leaders, one office manager, 17 team members (four of which were team 
leaders), four programming contract workers, and two interns. As shown in Table 2 
(below), nineteen of the 27 organization members (70.37%) were male and 21 (77.77%) 
were Caucasian. The members’ average age was 36.04 years and average tenure in the 
organization was 14.93 months. Twenty-two (81.48%) of the members had completed a 
four-year college degree and three of these had completed a graduate degree. At the 
time of this research there were three operational project teams (Red, Green and Black). 
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Table 2 
Software, Inc. Member Profiles 
 
Actor Sex Age Race Edu Status Tenure* Rank** Team 
Ann F 51 Caucasian AA Divorced 25 TM Red 
Bob M 43 Asian BS Married 7 TM Green 
Cece F 32 Caucasian HS Married 25 OM NA 
Dan M 48 Caucasian AA Married 12 TM Black 
Ed M 40 Caucasian BS Divorced 8 TM Black 
Fred M 32 Caucasian MBA Married 25 GL Red 
Greg M 35 Caucasian BS Married 25 TM Black 
Hal M 39 Asian BS Married 4 CN Red 
Ina F 35 Hispanic BS Married 18 TM Black 
Jim M 34 Hispanic BS Married 25 TM Green 
Kim F 21 Asian BS Single 3 IN Black 
Lou M 38 Caucasian BS Married 25 TM Black 
Mike M 28 Caucasian BS Married 3 TM Black 
Neal M 41 Caucasian BS Married 26 TM Green 
Orin M 36 Caucasian HS Married 4 CN Black 
Pat F 38 Caucasian MBA Married 26 GL Black, Green 
Quin M 33 Caucasian BS Married 6 IN Green 
Russ M 36 Caucasian BS Married 24 TM Green 
Sue F 39 Caucasian BS Married 19 TM Black 
Tina F 24 Asian BS Single 24 TM Black 
Ule M 28 Caucasian BS Married 21 TM Red 
Vic M 31 Caucasian BS Married 4 CN Black 
Walt M 38 Caucasian AA Divorced 3 GL none 
Xien M 41 Caucasian BS Married 9 TM Black 
Yuri M 45 Caucasian BS Divorced 6 TM Red 
Zia F 30 Caucasian MBA Single 1 CN Black 
Abe M 37 Caucasian BS Single 25 TM Green 
     *  Tenure is measured in months 
     ** TM = team member, GL = group leader, CN = contractor, IN = intern, OM = office manger 
 
Survey Data 
 The means from the Rokeach Value Survey are shown in Table 3 (below). Given 
Software’s operating objectives and structure it was not surprising to see the 
instrumental values Responsible, Honest, Capable and Ambitious ranked highly within 
the group. It was consistent with the types of people recruited into the organization. The 
lack of a rigid hierarchy also supported the expectation that Obedient would be ranked 
last. However, the values Imagination and Self-Controlled were expected to rank higher 
in the group due to the role of self-direction in the project teams. This possible 
disconnect between Software’s loose structure and its employee’s low value for self 
control may help explain the poor project performance. Similarly, the terminal value 
Equality was expected to rank higher given the stated mission of the organization. The 
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ranking of Happiness and Self-Respect are consistent with expectations of Software’s 
work environment. 
Table 3 
Software, Inc. RVS Rankings (by Mean) 
 
Terminal Values Mean St Dev Instrumental Values Mean St Dev
Family Security 5.00 4.08 Honest 4.93 4.84 
A Comfortable Life 5.89 5.11 Responsible 5.78 4.82 
Happiness 5.93 4.67 Capable 7.52 5.02 
Self Respect 6.85 3.69 Ambitious 7.63 4.95 
Inner Harmony 7.41 3.85 Intellectual 7.74 3.94 
True Friendship 7.67 3.42 Cheerful 7.96 3.87 
Pleasure 8.00 4.39 Independent 8.41 4.36 
A Sense of 
Accomplishment 
8.19 4.27 Loving 8.48 5.36 
Freedom 8.22 3.38 Logical 8.78 4.51 
Mature Love 8.37 4.47 Broadminded 8.85 4.72 
Wisdom 8.74 5.12 Helpful 9.74 4.69 
An Exciting Life 9.78 4.36 Courageous 10.22 3.68 
Social Recognition 12.19 4.45 Imaginative 10.30 4.25 
National Security 13.41 4.88 Forgiving 11.48 5.86 
A World of Beauty 13.48 4.55 Polite 11.63 2.79 
Equality 13.63 3.95 Self-controlled 12.22 4.46 
A World at Peace 13.89 3.42 Clean 13.11 3.96 
Salvation 14.37 4.41 Obedient 16.22 4.87 
 
 
The terminal values Happiness, A Comfortable Life and Self-Respect were 
expected to rank near the top because becoming a member of Software required 
multiple interviews where the openness and team ideas were routinely communicated. 
Thus, a candidate was well informed of the work conditions. Since a position within 
Software was described to be so different from traditional development organizations it 
was expected that potential members would rank these values favorably. However, 
Equality was not expected to rank sixteenth given the repeatedly stated objectives of the 
organization. 
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 The graphs of Software’s work and social (non-work) networks are shown in 
Figures 2 and 3 respectively (see appendix). Dichotomized data were used to filter out 
interactions occurring less than once per week. This provided a clearer view of the 
network structures by eliminating incidental interactions. In the work network, the three 
project teams are easily discernable. The figure revealed nearly complete interactions 
within development teams and significant cross boundary interactions as well. This is 
consistent with the design objectives of the organization. However, note the differences 
between Walt (W), the new president and Pat (P), the most senior group leader. Walt’s 
primary objectives were to get the project teams back on track, which he chose to 
execute via the group leaders and Cece (C) the office manager. The social network 
diagram revealed only a few minimally connected actors and less segmentation or 
cohesion than the work network. This was not surprising given that most work 
interactions would take place within the project teams. 
 Table 4 (below) shows the density and centralization measures for each network. 
While the work network was not as dense as the social network (had fewer of the total 
possible relationships), its relationships were more centralized. 
Table 4 
Density and Centralization Measures 
 
Network Measure Work Social 
Density 39% 49% 
Centralization (in degree) 32.692% 19.231% 
Centralization (out degree) 36.686% 23.225% 
 
Approximately one-third of the interactions from-others (in degree) and to-others 
(out degree) were found in the network’s ‘core.’ As is demonstrated, there were a group 
of actors with high interactions with other members. This also was to be expected given 
the allocation of work by project teams and their link with the management team. Again, 
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note the role of Pat in Figure 2. She was a group leader responsible for two project 
teams and played a very central role in attempts to improve performance. 
 Though less centralized, the social network was denser (had 49% of all possible 
ties) than the work network. This too was expected because of the relatively small size 
of the organization and the ease with which friendly relations could be maintained across 
the network. However, several members such as Greg, Lou, Dan and Abe clearly 
appeared to be more centrally connected. 
Coalition Identification 
 This research assumed that coalitions would be difficult to identify. The strategy 
to simplify this activity was to identify influential organizational members and those 
perceived to participate in collaborative influencing, and ask about their activities 
(specifically their interactions) regarding some important or contentious issue. It was 
hoped that this combination of influential members and important issues would lead to 
the identification of coalition members. 
 Individual influence. The primary objective of the interviews was to identify 
individuals and issues around which coalitions may develop (or operate). The starting 
point was to identify those members of the organization who were perceived to be 
powerful or influential (question 14 in appendix A) with the hope of identifying actors 
likely to engage in coalition activity (exercising their influence). This is not to suggest that 
perceived influence was a requirement in the identification process. Rather, it was hoped 
that it would simply make the discovery process easier. 
Each of the 27 research participants identified those people he or she believed to 
be powerful or influential. Lou, Fred, Walt, Greg, Pat, Russ, Ule and Sue were perceived 
to have influence in the organization given the number of respondents citing them (Table 
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5, below). Ann and Abe were omitted since each was cited only once. The remaining 
members of this sub-set represented possible candidates for coalition activity. 
Table 5 
Perceptions of Power/Influence 
 
Actor Frequency % 
Lou 20 17.54 
Fred 18 15.79 
Walt 17 14.91 
Greg 15 13.16 
Pat 13 11.40 
Russ 10 8.77 
Ule 10 8.77 
Sue 8 7.02 
Ann 1 .88 
Abe 1 .88 
Total 114 100% 
 
 Collaborative influence. The next question analyzed in this phase of my research 
referred to people’s perceptions of others who tended to collaborate to exert influence in 
the organization (appendix A, question 21). Table 6 (below) indicates how frequently 
members cited others, and sometimes themselves, as likely to engage in collaborative 
influencing. 
Table 6 
Perceptions of Collaborative Influence 
 
Actors Frequency % 
Greg 19 25.33 
Sue 15 20.00 
Lou 11 14.67 
Fred 10 13.33 
Ule 10 13.33 
Russ 4 5.33 
Abe 4 5.33 
Pat 2 2.67 
Total 75 100% 
 
 Again, it was simply hoped that these responses would facilitate the identification 
process. However, this question also was important because coordinated activity is a 
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feature of coalitions. Basically, these data, when combined with those from the previous 
section, provided a group of organization members I suspected to be more likely to 
engage in coalition activity. 
 Member issues. Once influential members were established, the final part of 
coalition identification focused on possible organizational issues or events. The idea 
here was that influential actors would be more likely to exert influence around certain 
issues. As with the questions regarding influential members and collaborative influence, 
this question (appendix A, question 16) was asked simply to help identify potential 
coalition starting points. Table 7 (below) identifies the issues cited by respondents. 
Table 7 
Important Organizational Issues 
 
Issue Count % 
Team/structure problems 17 37.78 
Compensation 11 24.45 
Improving project success 7 15.56 
Recruiting/retaining employees 4 8.89 
Training 2 4.44 
Organizational survival 2 4.44 
Flex time 1 2.22 
Dress code 1 2.22 
Total 45 100% 
 
 
 As indicated in the table, the most frequently mentioned concern had to do with 
the organization’s team-based structure. Seventeen respondents (37.78%) said it was 
an ongoing issue. To be sure, the notion of team-based work had been an issue since 
the organization’s founding. Members mentioned the perceived difficulty in accurately 
evaluating individual performance in a team environment where most emphasis was 
placed on team outcomes. Also, there were concerns that the team assignments and 
designations were becoming fixed and that a more formal three-level hierarchy would 
develop. Most of the comments here were directed at the role of team leaders and the 
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original idea that they were not intended to be a position different than other team 
members. 
 I selected team-based or structural issues to look for coalitions because this 
concern was broadly recognized and generated multiple comments and opinions, 
suggesting these were matters likely to spawn coalition activity. As mentioned, team-
related issues had been present throughout Software’s relatively short history, which 
may explain why interview participants identified team issues most frequently. Since the 
company’s inception team members had challenged group leaders over involvement in 
non-development activities. Examples included team members’ desires to assess and 
arrange their own training programs, become more involved in recruiting decisions, 
determine individual and project performance measures, and to have access to business 
unit planning and reporting documents. One particularly contentious aspect of the team 
issue pertained to roles within the team structure. As reported, Software’s structure was 
intended (and repeatedly communicated) to be flat, having only two hierarchical levels 
(group leaders and team members) utilizing self-directed work teams (frequently referred 
to as high-performing teams). 
 Several factors contributed to perceived problems with Software’s structure. First, 
the role of team leader, while described as an informal position suggested that some 
difference in rank or status existed relative to other team members. To make matters 
worse, team members designated team leaders rarely were reassigned. This was due in 
part to the duration of Software’s projects. Two of the three active projects started with 
the organization’s founding. In any event, other team members had not seen teams 
reassigned and new team leaders selected. 
 Second, the demand for computer programmers in the external labor market was 
greater than it had been for several years. Many team members believed that Software’s 
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lack of titles not only made it difficult to compare jobs, but also to adequately describe 
job qualifications and histories to potential future employers. Nationally, the software 
development industry had distinct job levels, such as programmer, senior programmer, 
and developer. Yet, regardless of skills and experience, nearly everyone within Software 
was identified simply as a team member. The lack of job designations caused a level of 
uncertainty for some members who were more familiar with the roles and responsibilities 
associated with more traditional career positions. 
 Third, Software’s performance problems, evident since it’s founding, reflected 
poorly on the viability of self-directed, high-performance teams. Fourth, the termination 
of the original president and subsequent replacement from one of Parent’s other 
technology units suggested to some that Software’s mission (i.e., to be different than the 
other units) no longer was viable. 
Coalitions 
 To reiterate, the following criteria were used to determine coalitions in this 
research; they are informal groups (not identified as part of the organization’s formal 
structure), lack their own (internal) formal structure, members have a general awareness 
of other members in the coalition, they focus on externally-oriented objectives, and have 
members who recognize a need for concerted or collaborative action. 
 As described in the previous sections, analysis of the interview data revealed a 
subgroup of members who were perceived to be both influential and likely to collaborate 
to influence others. Table 8 (below) summarizes how this initial evidence has identified 
various actors with potential for participating in coalition activities. As the check marks 
indicate, all actors in this group were reported to be both influential and likely to 
collaborate to influence others. 
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Table 8 
Evidence for Possible Coalition Activity 
 
 Perceived to be Perceived to be Likely 
Actor Powerful/Influential To Collaborate 
Fred a a 
Greg a a 
Lou a a 
Pat a a 
Russ a a 
Sue a a 
Ule a a 
 
 Following identification, the set of potential coalition members were interviewed 
to identify others in the organization with whom they interacted (contacted, 
communicated, etc.) regarding the team/structure issue. Then, those others were 
interviewed and asked to do the same. This process (referred to as "snowballing") 
continued until no new members were identified. In each case, interaction frequency 
data were captured and members were asked to explain their rationale for joining the 
group of influencers (i.e., the coalition), why they interacted in the manners observed 
and described, and to identify any activities or tactics used to influence others. 
 Coalition 1. According to interview data, Fred was a reasonable starting point for 
coalition identification. He was a group leader (promoted from team leader) assigned to 
the Red project team. As with many other members, Fred was very concerned with 
Software’s structure, “Particularly in terms of project success and the survival of the 
company.” When asked if he did anything about the team structure issue he said, “We’ve 
had thousands of discussions and tried to form a committee.” His focus was primarily 
performance oriented. For example, he offered, “Some of the people around here don’t 
get where the team boundaries need to be, you know, we’ve got to get moving and 
coding.” 
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 When asked if he planned to do anything about this issue Fred replied, “Nothing 
out of the normal operation. Well maybe I can get a committee created to bring it up in 
front of [Walt, the president] in the right way. He’s new and probably doesn’t appreciate 
what we can do here. I think we need to revisit how our structure influences the way we 
work, or don’t work. I think we’ve been too loose.”  When asked if he thought other 
people were as concerned, he said, “Yes, it’s just some of them want to keep this team 
thing in the center of what we do. I don’t think they realize how crippled we’ve been just 
trying to identify what teams are.”  Finally, Fred was asked if he had contacted anyone 
regarding this issue. He replied, “I bring it up when I can, I think it’s that important, and 
when I think it’s right.  [Ule] probably more than anyone else, I think we see things, or at 
least this thing, the same way.”  Russ, Ann, Jim, Pat and Tina also were identified as 
targets for such discussions. 
 Fred stated that “A goal” was to get enough people to “Push” for the creation of a 
committee charged with reviewing Software’s structure. While this required the support 
of the group leaders, previous committees had been formed based on visible support 
from team members across the organization. Fred’s strategy was to try to persuade 
other team members that structural changes, such as clearer roles and more defined 
reporting relationships, would benefit everyone and the projects. Fred even started using 
different language in electronic mail messages within Software in an attempt to get 
people out of the two-group mindset. For example, he began using the term ‘associate’ 
rather than ‘team member.’ 
 Using the snowball technique mentioned earlier, the actors referenced by Fred 
were interviewed to validate coalition membership, interaction frequencies, and coalition 
objectives and strategies. Ule was a relatively new team leader on the Red project team. 
Ule put the structure issue in terms of leadership, stating, “I’m not sure a real or strong 
 59
leader can exist in this environment. It doesn’t seem to be something that would fit with 
our version of project teams.” He mentioned that he was willing to openly discuss this 
issue with anyone, but most of the original members preferred the way the organization 
was initially arranged. He also agreed that having a committee created would be the 
best way to get Walt’s attention and offset the strength of the other (opposing) group. He 
mentioned that their strategy would take time given the strength of the team concept 
within Software and the support that it received from other members. 
 Russ, a team leader on the Green project confirmed interactions (discussions) 
with Ule and Fred and agreed to trying to build support for the creation of a committee. 
However, he was not as convinced as Fred and Ule that the team structure needed 
altering, but the problems were significant enough to warrant exploration of possible 
alternatives. Ann, Jim, Pat and Tina confirmed that several conversations had occurred 
with Fred and Ule in reference to the committee, but they did not completely share this 
view and most likely were not interested in changing the structure from what was 
originally intended. Generally, they believed that current operational problems could be 
corrected within the team-based environment. Consequently, these members were not 
considered part of the coalition. 
 During their interviews Fred, Russ and Ule were asked to rate the frequency with 
which they interacted regarding the structure issue (using the same scale as the work 
and social self-report instruments). It was explained that interaction included planning as 
well as execution activities. In general, the group’s strategy was to suggest the 
committee idea as a means of problem assessment when anyone brought up a 
structure-related issue. Basically, they planned to keep offering it as an exploratory step 
rather than openly recommending any specific change. The key to their strategy was to 
have a committee assess the structure and poor development performance and hope 
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Walt would make specific changes. The possible intervention by the president was 
important since their position was not as popular as the view of the other coalition. 
 Coalition 1 analyses. Coalition 1 formed as a means of changing Software’s 
hierarchy to a more traditional model and redefining the way in which the team concept 
was interpreted. The coalition consisted of three Caucasian males (Fred, Russ and Ule), 
ages 28 to 36. All members were married and had relatively long tenure with the 
organization (average of 23.33 months). Each was a team leader or group leader. In 
addition, the members had some similar work histories and each completed at least a 
BS degree. Ule and Fred worked together at a previous employer and Ule and Russ 
worked together on a previous project (White). There was no agreement among the 
members on questions of political activity and actions making a difference in the world 
(questions 12, 13 in appendix A). All coalition members worked in close physical 
proximity to each other. 
 Data from the Rokeach Value Survey (Table 9, appendix) showed a number of 
similarities. For example, on the terminal values, Fred, Ule and Russ ranked Inner 
Harmony nearly equally (4, 5 and 5 respectively). In addition, Russ and Ule ranked A 
Comfortable Life highest, Russ and Ule ranked Freedom third, Ule ranked Salvation 13th 
and Russ ranked it 14th, and Russ and Fred ranked Self Respect 16th and Social 
Recognition 15th. For the instrumental values, Russ and Ule ranked Ambitious high (one 
and two respectively), and Russ and Fred ranked Capable high (two and three 
respectively). Ule and Russ also ranked Logical high (5th and 6th respectively). 
 The network diagram for Coalition 1 (Figure 4, appendix) depicts a density of 
100% (all relationships present). Due to the coalition’s small size, there was no core 
(centralization). Binary network centrality measures (Table 12, appendix) showed that in 
the social network, Fred reported interactions with nearly all other actors (25 of 26 
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others, 96%) and was reported as a social link by 24 others (92%). This indicated a high 
level of interaction agreement between Fred and other actors. However, both Ule and 
Russ reported fewer connections to others (50%), but were cited as links by others 
(88.5% and 84.6%), slightly above the normalized mean value of 77.635%. 
 In the work network (Table 13, appendix), it was expected that the number of 
interactions would be fewer than those in the social network due to the requirement of 
work within project teams. However, Fred reported the maximum links to others (26, 
100%) and was cited as a link by 19 other actors (73%). Russ too was above average 
for outbound links and approximately average for inbound links. 
 Tables 14 and 15 (appendix) provide degree measures using valued relationship 
data. Unlike binary data, valued data reflects the strength or weight of reported links. 
The relative order did not change, Fred was highly central (well connected) and Ule and 
Russ reported low ties to others and approximately average from others. However, in the 
social network, the aggregated strength of the links reported to Fred (59) are much 
closer to the population mean (53). This suggests that the relatively value or frequency 
of the links is lower in magnitude or effect. In other words, while many actors reported 
links to Fred (binary data) the frequency or strength of the interactions (valued data) was 
lower. A similar condition existed in the valued work network (Table 15). Fred reported 
more and stronger links to others than were reported to him. Ule and Russ were closer 
to the population mean for work interactions. 
 The next position-level analysis was structural equivalence within the coalition 
(Table 16, appendix). Though the coalition actors were not perfectly equivalent, it is clear 
that they had very similar relationships with each other. Due to the coalition’s relatively 
small size, measures of regular equivalence were not helpful because all coalition 
members had similar interactions. 
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The final position measure was strength using N-clan data (Tables 20 and 21, 
appendix). For identification purposes, this measure required all links (not to exceed N 
steps) among actors to occur through other members of the group (rather than through 
actors outside the group). The value of N was set at one because higher values would 
result in a single group due to network size. 
 Table 20 (appendix) shows the number of 1-clans identified in the work network 
and the frequency with which actors were included. Fred was identified in 33 of the 46 
groups possible in the data set (71.74%). Ule and Russ were closer to the mean number 
of groups per actor (28.66%). In the social network (Table 21), Fred again was very 
highly ranked having been identified in 54 of the possible 75 possible (72%). Russ and 
Ule were not as frequently identified, being well below (18.67% and 13.33% 
respectively) the mean value of 29.88%. Fred’s potential to influence, or at least access, 
others was very high in each network. 
 Coalition 2. As with the first case, the approach here was to use interview data to 
identify actors likely to collaborate as well as the actors with whom they did. The 
interview data suggested that Greg (among others) was a suitable starting point. He was 
perceived to be influential and was cited the most for engaging in collaborative attempts 
at influencing others. Greg was a team member on the Black project team. During the 
first interview, he identified compensation as the biggest issue facing the organization. 
However, since team-structure issues rated highest across the organization, Greg was 
asked his views on team and organization structure. He suggested that Software’s 
structure remained “Innovative” and offered significant (though unrealized) performance 
opportunities. Software’s current problems, according to Greg, stemmed simply from a 
lack of ground rules. However, he acknowledged the existence of two opposing groups. 
“You basically have two camps, (Fred) and (Ule) and their followers, and (Pat), (Lou), 
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(Abe), (Sue) and me. We are the agents of change, we believe the most in the original 
vision.” This was an interesting choice of words (and often repeated) because, as is 
explained below, this group didn’t want to facilitate change. Rather, they wished to 
maintain the status quo. 
 Greg was asked if he intended to do anything about the structure issue, 
particularly in light of the other group (Coalition 1). His response was that they (citing 
Lou, Sue, and Abe) intended to get the president and group leaders to agree to create 
(with the team members) a document that would outline the philosophies and 
procedures necessary to fulfill the original corporate mission. It was intended that all 
employees of Software would sign this document. The key to this strategy was that the 
process to create the agreement would not be as tedious as establishing and 
maintaining another committee. Also, it was believed that more people would be 
involved in this process, which would make it easier to build commitment to the original 
mission and structure. 
 As with Greg, Lou (a team leader on the Black project) also did not identify 
Software’s structure as an issue during the first interview. However, when asked about 
the agreement document (as stated by Greg) he validated Greg’s account.  Interestingly, 
he commented that he was most likely to discuss issues with the original seven 
(members) because they “Seem to be more active in preserving the (initial) mission”. 
The original members were Ann, Fred, Greg, Jim, Lou, Russ and Abe. Lou confirmed 
Sue and Abe as team members involved in the effort to get an agreement document 
created. In addition, he cited group leader Pat. Lou also mentioned that he didn’t believe 
the document would be enough to save the organization given their performance 
problems and the recent replacement of Software’s president. 
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 Pat was the senior group leader in the organization and was part of the group 
that had helped to plan and create the organization. She believed the structure issue to 
be important and regarded it as a problem of “Role identities.” She explained that they 
(management) have not been able to “Pin down what all these people are supposed to 
do.” She mentioned that this resulted in “A great deal of ambiguity and prevents us from 
identifying leadership.” When asked about the effort to create an agreement document 
she verified earlier accounts and said, “We have two distinct groups here; [Fred] people 
and [Pat] people, and it all revolves around differences in management style, the degree 
of comfort we try to produce and even our competitiveness.” 
 Sue was another team leader on the Black project (the only team with multiple 
team leaders). She too identified other issues (compensation and morale) during the first 
interview. When asked about the agreement document and collaborating with others she 
verified the strategy and mentioned that self-directed teams were supposed to function 
in such a manner. According to Sue, “We all think team-based work should work like 
this, with open communication.”  Regarding the form of communication, she said, “Most 
are unplanned, being in our team we’re naturally close to each other, our days are very 
unstructured so we can cover what we want when we want, face-to-face is fastest and 
easiest.”  Finally, she confirmed collaboration with Greg, Lou and Abe. 
 Abe was a team member on the Green project team. Again, structure was not an 
issue identified during his first interview. He verified collaboration with Greg, and said he 
also worked with Lou and Jim. Jim was a team member on the Green project team. He 
reported that “Very few” issues concern him and that he always tried to operate through 
“Formal channels to avoid a lot of what is going on around here.” Consequently, Jim was 
omitted from coalition consideration. 
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Coalition 2 analyses. This coalition was formed to clarify, but generally maintain, 
Software’s current use of teams. It consisted of five Caucasian members (Greg, Lou, 
Abe, Sue and Pat), 35 to 39 years old. All had long tenure with the organization (average 
24 months). All had attained at least a BS degree. Greg and Sue worked together at a 
previous organization and Greg, Lou and Abe worked together on a previous project. 
Pat, Lou, and Sue believed their actions did make a difference in the world. These three 
actors also considered themselves politically active. All except Abe worked in close 
physical proximity to each other. 
As with Coalition 1, the RVS data showed widespread similarities when member 
pairs were evaluated. Nearly all instrumental values showed some level of similarity 
within the coalition (at least between pairs). Also, as with Coalition 1, the terminal value 
Equality and the instrumental value Obedient are uniformly ranked near the bottom of 
their respective lists. The instrumental value Honest was ranked first for three members 
of the group (actors Lou, Sue and Abe). 
The network diagram of Coalition 2 is provided in the appendix (Figure 5). Again, 
due to the group’s relative size, network density was 100% (all possible interactions 
present) and centralization was zero (no core). A review of binary centrality measures for 
the social network (Table 12) shows that four of the five coalition members were above 
the mean for both out-degree and in-degree scores. Greg, Lou and Abe had the highest 
reported inbound links (25, 24 and respectively) and Lou (26) and Greg (25) were 
among the highest in out-bound links. Valued data for the social network (Table 14) 
confirmed the relative centrality of these relationships. In the binary work network (Table 
13), all coalition members had centrality measures above the mean for both in and out-
degrees. Similar findings are reported in the valued centrality measures (Table 15). Four 
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of the five members were above the mean. Abe (51.0 for out and in-degree) was just 
below the mean of 52.259. 
Structural equivalence measures for Coalition 2 members are found on Table 17 
(appendix). The data show that Sue and Lou were most similar (r = .91), but all were 
correlated at a level of .73 and above. N-clan analysis of the work network (Table 20) 
show that all coalition members had relatively high levels of connectedness. All scored 
well above the mean of 28.66%. In fact, Coalition 2 members held five of the top nine 
values. In the social network (Table 21), all members except Pat were above the mean. 
Lou and Greg were identified in 60 and 59 of the 75 clusters. 
Comparative analyses. These analyses assess all coalition members to other 
actors (non-coalition members) in the organization. These analyses include group 
means comparisons of the RVS data, network-wide measures of equivalence, 
relationship importance (Lambda sets), and network correlations. 
 The mean RVS rank data show some key distinctions between Coalition 1 
members and non-coalition members (Table 10, appendix). Since the present study 
hopes to distinguish coalition members from non-coalition members the focus with RVS 
data primarily was on dissimilarity. This was accomplished by calculating the difference 
in numerical order for each value pair (Table 11, appendix). For example, if the average 
ranks for the terminal value Wisdom in two groups were first and fifth, then the reported 
ordinal difference (delta) would be four (rank or ordinal places). The similarity (or 
dissimilarity) in overall rank order suggests the similarity (or dissimilarity) in overall value 
systems. 
 The largest dissimilarities in the terminal values between Coalition 1 members 
and non-members are Self-Respect (difference of 11 ordinal places, 14th and 3rd 
respectively), Freedom (eight places), An Exciting Life (eight places), Family Security 
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(seven places) and A World of Beauty (seven places). The strongest similarities in the 
terminal values are Salvation with the same (last) ranking, and Equality, A Sense of 
Accomplishment, Pleasure and National Security differing by only one ordinal place. 
 The largest dissimilarities in the instrumental values between Coalition 1 
members and non-members are Responsible (12 places, 14th and 2nd respectively), 
Intellectual (10 places), Polite (10 places) and Clean and Cheerful (seven places each). 
The strongest similarities are Obedient (same rank, 18th) and Forgiving (same rank) and 
Courageous, Broadminded and Logical, which are separated by only one ordinal place. 
The RVS means comparisons between Coalition 2 and non-coalition members 
(Tables 10 and 11) are interesting. The largest dissimilarity in the terminal values 
between coalition 2 members and non-members is Freedom (eight places, 3rd and 11th 
respectively). However, there are numerous similarities between these groups. A World 
at Peace, An Exciting Life, Happiness, Inner Harmony, Pleasure, and Wisdom have the 
same rankings. In addition, Self-Respect and Social Recognition differ by only one 
ordinal place between the groups. 
 The largest dissimilarities in the instrumental values between Coalition 2 
members and non-members are Logical (nine places, 15th and 6th respectively), 
Intellectual (nine places), Ambitious (eight places), Courageous and Loving (seven 
places each). Again, there are several strong similarities in the instrumental values. 
Capable, Clean, Honest, Obedient and Responsible have the same rank order between 
the groups and Helpful differs only by one (10th and 11th respectively). 
 The final RVS assessment focuses on the similarity of mean rankings between 
Coalition 1 and Coalition 2 (Table 11, appendix). In the terminal values segment the 
most dissimilar values are Self-Respect (10 places) and An Exciting Life (eight places). 
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A Comfortable Life, Freedom and True Friendship were exact matches while Pleasure 
differed by only one place. 
 For the instrumental values, Ambitious and Responsible show the largest 
separation (12 places) followed by Logical (eight places) and Clean (seven places). 
Independent and Obedient reflect the greatest similarities (same ranking) between 
Coalition 1 and 2. In addition, Broadminded, Intellectual, Loving, and Self-Controlled are 
separated by one place. 
 Table 18 (appendix) shows the structural equivalence cluster diagram for 
Software’s work network. The most structurally equivalent, or most similar actors were 
Jim and Abe (.959), Ann and Yuri (.944) and Dan and Tina (.926). These pairs of actors 
worked on the same project teams (Green, Red and Black respectively). The highest 
grouping of coalition members was Greg and Lou at .841. In other words, approximately 
84% of their relationships to others were similar (but not as similar as some relationships 
between non-coalition members). Russ and Abe at .892, but this cluster also includes 
non-coalition members Jim and Bob. 
 Table 19 (appendix) shows the structural equivalence clusters for Software’s 
social network. Vic and Orin were the most equivalent and worked on the same project 
team (Black). However, Lou and Sue were similar at .745 and joined with Greg at .671. 
Regular equivalence measures were not included because all actors aggregated at 92.7 
across both networks. This was again most likely due to overall network size and the 
inherent likelihood of relationship similarity. It is more likely (easier) to have similar 
relationships with others when the number of others is small. 
 Lambda set analysis was used to identify ‘important’ pairs or groups of actors in 
the networks. Important refers to the likelihood of network disruption if such pairs or 
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groups were removed. A lambda value is generated to give a measure of cohesion. The 
higher the lambda value the more network disruption likely to result from pair removal. 
Table 22 (appendix) shows the Lambda set results for Software’s work network. 
Cece and Pat were most important. This was not unexpected because Pat was the 
senior Group Leader and took on additional work responsibilities during the change in 
Software’s president. Cece was the office manager and maintained work-based 
relationships with nearly all other actors. However, coalition members clearly held the 
most important positions in the network (six of the top seven positions, 85.7%). In the 
social network (Table 23, appendix) coalition members were more distributed, but 
coalition members (Fred, Lou, Greg and Abe) again occupied four of the top five (80%) 
values, with Lou, Greg and Fred most important. 
 The final structural analysis in this research was to test coalition interaction 
patterns for correlation with existing work and social interaction patterns for the same 
actors. This was accomplished by extracting the coalition member relationships from the 
original work and social network data sets. In other words, the interaction values for the 
three actors that comprised Coalition 1 were extracted from the entire Software work and 
social data. This was done because network correlation algorithms (quadratic 
assignment procedure or QAP) required equally sized matrices for calculation. QAP 
results for each coalition are in Table 24 (appendix). For each coalition, the members’ 
interaction patterns were more closely correlated to their social relationships (.657 and 
.594 to .379 and .205 respectively). 
Chapter Summary 
 To reiterate, this research identified two coalitions pertaining to Software’s 
structural issues. Members of Coalition 1 (Fred, Ule and Russ) worked together to 
facilitate an organizational change they perceived was necessary.  They wanted to try to 
 70
build support for the creation of a committee to investigate structural alternatives. It was 
hoped that a committee would increase visibility with the president to counter the 
opposing (and majority) view that Software’s structure should remain as-is. Coalition 1 
was quite homogeneous in terms of age, race, education, gender, tenure and marital 
status. Each member was either a group lead or team lead. Two members (Fred and 
Ule) worked on the same project team and even had a shared history with a previous 
employer. All members were perceived to be influential. 
 Coalition 2 (Greg, Lou, Sue, Pat and Abe) was formed in response to the same 
issue as Coalition 1. However, its members wished to preserve Software’s original 
structure and team-based orientation. They favored the creation of a binding document 
that specifically outlined the roles and policies necessary to make sure the original 
structure was preserved. Their objective was to keep the process informal (i.e., no 
committee) because they believed their strength was in the majority opinion they 
supported. A formal procedure such as a committee with more direct involvement by the 
president could allow for more unilateral (and possibly unfavorable) decisions. Coalition 
2 was more heterogeneous than Coalition 1, but certainly not diverse. All were 
Caucasian with long tenure and similar educations, but age, gender and marital status 
varied more than with Coalition 1. Members were group leads, team leads and team 
members. Actors Greg and Sue worked together at a previous organization. All except 
Abe were believed to be influential. 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion 
This research explored coalition formation within an organization as a means of 
offering a better approach to the study of these important groups. The questions that 
drove this investigation focused on the nature of the relationships that comprise 
coalitions as well as their aggregated structural features. The methods, instruments and 
data used proved to be suitable for coalition research. In this section I discuss the overall 
study, provide comments pertaining to the existing literature, review the use of social 
network analysis and the Rokeach Value Survey, discuss limitations of the study, and 
offer avenues for future research. 
This research was an exploratory case study undertaken within a functioning 
organization. The people, issues and history involved in these activities were identified 
through semi-structured interviews. Surveys were used to assess demographic factors 
and members’ work and social interaction patterns. The Rokeach Value Survey was 
used to assess population and group value systems (a proxy for belief systems). Overall, 
coalition identification proved to be less challenging than expected. This may have been 
due to the open communication that had been preached since Software’s creation and 
thus more difficult in larger, more established organizations where formal and informal 
behavioral constraints may exist. 
There are several comments pertaining to formation factors (variables) in the 
extant literature and findings in the present study. First, Software’s coalitions seemed to 
form in a manner consistent with explanations found in existing research. Each was 
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guided by members’ beliefs or views concerning an issue. In each case, coalition 
members thought strongly about Software’s structure. In fact, those organization 
members that were somewhat indifferent did not participate in influencing attempts 
(though they had opinions). Second, neither coalition represented a majority and reward 
maximization didn’t apply. However, there was a desired outcome (structural change or 
status quo) and it had the potential to impact the entire organization. 
Third, coalition size played a role, but not in the distribution of a reward. Instead, 
size determined the strategy employed by the coalitions. Coalition 1 hoped the creation 
of a committee would couple or bind an assessment of Software’s structure and its 
performance problems. The members felt this would force Walt to make a unilateral 
decision and change the organization. This action would bypass the perceived strength 
of Coalition 2 and the perception that most non-members preferred the status quo. 
Coalition 2’s strategy reflected the desire to increase strength by adding members 
through simple, person-to-person communication. The agreement creation process 
would allow all organization members to participate in discussions and document editing. 
Coalition members believed this would enable them to address non-members’ objections 
and provide time to tailor their message (and influence others). 
Lastly, power appeared to be important to the coalitions in this study, but not as a 
means of actor domination (Caplow, 1956, 1959; Chertkoff, 1967). Rather, each coalition 
seemed to act from positions they believed were low in power. This is consistent with the 
idea that coalitions develop as a result of their perceptions of relative low power (Mannix 
& White, 1992). The basis of this perception was that neither group had any established 
links to the new president. Thus, each coalition attempted to influence others to yield a 
favorable decision. Interestingly, each group was acting based on the potential impact of 
the issue. There was no pending decision regarding Software’s structure. 
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As mentioned, other research has suggested the possibility that similar socio-
demographic variables may contribute to coalition formation. Demographic data from this 
study confirms that coalition members have somewhat strong similarities with each 
other. All had relatively long tenure with the organization, similar educational 
backgrounds, marital status, and age (though Coalition 1 was more homogenous). 
Indeed, members had strong similarities within and across coalitions. In other words, 
demographics provided some distinction between coalition members (combined) and 
non-coalition members within Software. Interestingly, while tenure was not the sole 
determinant in formation (not all senior members participated), none of the contractor 
employees or actors with less than 19 months tenure participated in either coalition. 
 Such similarities among coalition members support the idea that potential 
members seek out and collaborate with similar others (Boros et al., 1997; Dreze & 
Greenberg, 1980). Such similarities may convey, until otherwise known, signs of positive 
identification. One’s positive identification with others has been associated with 
friendship, trust or some degree of comfort that supports collaborative action, particularly 
in controversial scenarios (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Goffman, 1969; McPherson & 
Smith-Lovin, 1987). 
 However, it might be that the positive identifications that lead to collaborative 
(coalition) activity are based on similar perceptions rather than direct matches among 
socio-demographic factors. This idea is well documented in the social network literature 
(Burt, 1982; Carley & Krackhardt, 1996; Casciaro, 1998; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993). For 
example, given that most coalition members were part of the founding group (five of 
seven) it may be that they interpreted Software’s ongoing performance problem as a 
threat to something they perceived to have created and to which they strongly identified. 
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Perhaps the members of Coalition 1 could more easily let go of the original design and 
its philosophy, or they desired the opportunity to influence, if possible, a new design. 
Social network analysis provided a useful method for understanding coalitions, 
particularly coalition members and the key positions they occupied. I stated in the 
previous chapter that certain positions might enable members to influence or 
communicate with (by having access to) others more easily. Though it may be that 
certain organization members are more likely to join coalitions due to their relative 
position. In summary, coalition members generally were more central, demonstrated 
positional similarity (equivalence) among members of each coalition, and had more 
opportunities to influence. 
 Lambda set analysis demonstrated that coalition members were more 
critical (important) to the work network (Table 22, appendix). Coalition members 
occupied six of the first seven positions in the cluster (and eight of the top 12). Coalition 
members were more distributed in the critical positions in the social network (Table 23), 
but still produced the highest three measures. Similarly, in the N-clan analyses, coalition 
members accounted for eight of the 13 (61.5%) highest reported actors (most 
connected, more robust, etc.) in the work network (Table 20) including the three most 
frequently clustered actors (Lou, Fred and Pat). While coalition members were more 
distributed in the social network (Table 21), the highest reported actors in the 
organization and five of the highest eight were coalition members. 
 Finally, there were high levels of structural equivalence within each coalition. In 
the work network (Table 16), the greatest equivalence was found among non-coalition 
members. The primary exception to this was Abe who was nearly perfectly equivalent 
(.959) to Jim. Multiple coalition members did not demonstrate any similarity until the .84 
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level. In the social network (Table 17), more of the initial (highest) pair similarities involve 
coalition members. However, clusters did not begin until the .76 level. 
 The Rokeach Value Survey also provided a benefit to this study, but as is 
explained below, was hampered by the organization’s size. While it was difficult to 
interpret overall systems (ranks) for the entire population, the RVS worked well when 
comparing coalition members and means between coalition and non-coalition actors 
(Tables 11 and 12, appendix). Most surprisingly, members of Coalition 2 appeared to be 
quite similar to non-coalition members, particularly with instrumental values. This further 
strengthens the correlation found between coalition members and their social (non-work) 
interactions. In addition, this similarity may help explain the uphill battle members of 
Coalition 1 described in swaying the popular opinion regarding the status quo. It also 
suggests that Coalition 2 had the potential to be significantly larger. 
 While it is a benefit that the RVS enables the identification of values for similarity 
assessment, I was surprised at the values that frequently matched between groups. For 
example, Coalitions 1 and 2 ranked the terminal values A Comfortable Life first, 
Freedom third and True Friendship ninth. Though they differed on Equality and Self-
Respect which were expected to be more valued in such a work setting. 
Research Limitations 
While this research provided some benefits to the study of intra-organizational 
coalitions, there are some important limitations that should be addresses. The first issue 
concerns Software’s size. While the relatively small organization enabled more complete 
data collection it also restricted nearly all analyses in one way or another, with the most 
significant impacts on SNA and RVS data. For example, in terms of network analytics, 
the ease with which organization members could maintain multiple types of relationships 
with a relatively large percentage of the organization had the effect of limiting structural 
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separation or segmentation by relationship type (i.e., work and non-work) as well as 
between coalition members and non-members. A larger organization may have enabled 
larger coalitions and relatively less dense relationships, which most likely would have 
identified greater structural distinctions within and across groups. 
Software’s size also had an effect on the use the Rokeach Value Survey data. 
The research population (N=27) facilitated a cursory evaluation of pair-wise 
comparisons, but was insufficient for more rigorous statistical testing. Obviously, a larger 
organization would permit more detailed measurement of member and non-member 
rankings. So, even though standard statistical measures are not applicable to ordinal 
data, a larger dataset would allow measurement and inferences on specific actor pairs 
and value ranks (made non-ordinal). Therefore, in the present study, the effects of actor 
belief systems are incomplete. 
The second limitation is concerned with the use of broad value systems or 
ideology in this study. Though similarities and dissimilarities were found, the number of 
values in the RVS didn’t provide a means of clearly distinguishing coalitions members or 
non-members. Again, this is certainly an artifact of Software’s small size. Though, it also 
may be that the comprehensive nature of the survey (i.e., a complete value system) 
doesn’t cleanly address key elements of members’ belief systems in organizational life. 
For example, the constraints on individuals at work and quite possibly the underlying 
need to remain employed may over-ride or suppress all responses (e.g., coalition 
activity) except those triggered by dramatic differences between key values and 
perceptions. In other words, it is possible that most individual values within a system are 
held in check until only relatively large conflicts between a value and an organizational 
event occurs. In any event, a more focused or organization-specific instrument (perhaps 
one concerning issues of governance or fairness) may provide more insight into the 
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suspected link between perception or beliefs and coalition activity. Thus, while coalition 
activity was issue driven, it is uncertain whether values influenced the perception of the 
issue and the impetus for coalition activity. 
The final limitation of the present study is the constrained time frame of the 
research. I did find support for the idea that coalition interactions parallel social 
relationships so that certain assumptions can be made about how they are likely to 
change over time (i.e., follow friendship patterns). However, given that value and belief 
systems, perceptions of events and even relationship tend to change over time, the 
overall link between these variables, say through multiple issues and coalitions, remains 
unclear. 
Future Research 
 I contend this study has provided a richer picture of organizational coalitions and, 
more importantly, a foundation for a more productive research base. The methods 
employed in the current study demonstrate that identifying and exploring coalitions is 
quite possible. Yet, as suggested in the preceding limitations, it is only a first step. As I 
have argued, coalition research should continue to include and expand upon the use of 
socio-demographic and contextual factors. This will further improve the detail and 
accuracy within the field. More specifically to the present study, future coalition research 
should address the issues of organization size, longitudinal methodologies, values and 
beliefs, and the links to other existing literatures. 
Building on the present study with larger organizations would provide several 
benefits. First, a larger population would enable more complete social network 
assessments. The simple fact that people can maintain only a limited number of work 
and social relationships suggests that larger research populations would demonstrate 
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unique (or less hidden) structural features. Second, larger organizations would allow for 
more rigorous analysis (i.e., statistical) of RVS data. 
 Follow-on work also should address coalition activity using multiple time periods. 
This would help bring additional understanding to activities such as coalition life cycles, 
selection of and changes in tactics and membership, and possibly even internal coalition 
structure (hierarchy). An additional benefit of longitudinal studies would be greater clarity 
of causality in coalition activity. For instance, a coalition member’s high centrality in the 
social network may be due to her attempts to influence others, rather than as a structural 
quality developed prior to coalition activity. I suspect the latter is more likely since people 
tend to report interaction data based on their patterns over time. More interestingly, 
consider the possibility that members form coalitions (around some antecedent factor) 
and then identify and communicate an issue. Following Weick’s (1979) concept of sense 
making in organizations, in this case an issue might not exist until a coalition says that it 
does. Obviously, assessments conducted at multiple time periods would aid in the 
explanation of these possible events. 
 The final argument for a longitudinal study is the fact that value systems tend to 
change over time (Kamakura & Mazzon, 1991; Ovadia, 2004). In the present study, the 
RVS data simply are a snapshot of a single point in Software’s existence. While it is 
doubtful the value rankings would have changed over the duration of the study (eleven 
weeks), it is likely that value priorities eventually would change given the shifting and 
competing internal and external pressures common in organizational life. Being able to 
identify and integrate such changes with SNA data would almost certainly provide a 
unique and more comprehensive picture of organizational coalitions. 
 Another avenue for improvement is the continued exploration of values and belief 
systems in coalition research. A logical first step would be to duplicate this study using 
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the RVS in a larger organization. As mentioned throughout this study, the suspicions of a 
link between member perceptions and coalition activity are strong. Future coalition 
research would benefit from a more complete test of the RVS. However, I do recognize 
that a more focused instrument, perhaps one that measures ideas of organizational 
governance, fairness or even altruism (the list of possible key values could be long), 
might more easily make the connection between beliefs and coalition activity. 
 Finally, it would be prudent to explore links between coalition research and 
existing literatures. One area of organization studies that is more expansive than and 
may provide guidance to coalition research is the work on organization culture, 
particularly subcultures. The pervasive nature of subcultures in organizations has been 
well documented (Bloor & Dawson, 1994; Boisnier & Chatman, 2002; Cameron & Quinn, 
1999; Chatman, 2002; Flynn & Chatman, 2001; Hofstede, 1998; Jermier, Slocum, Fry, & 
Gaines, 1991; Martin, 1992; Schein, 1996; Smircich, 1983; Trice, 1993; Van Maanen & 
Barley, 1984).  Subcultures are groups whose common characteristic is a set of shared 
norms and beliefs. Similar to coalitions, subcultures can (and do) form around informal 
elements of organizations (Trice & Beyer, 1993). As with coalitions, subcultures have 
been compared to relatively small clusters of organization members that share a set of 
norms, values, and beliefs (Boisnier & Chatman, 2002).  
 Several researchers have suggested that cultures and subculture may enable 
organizations to adapt to change (Boisnier & Chatman, 2002; Gagliardi, 1986; O’Reilly, 
1989; Saffold, 1988; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997). It may be that coalitions, or the 
recognition of them, are a subcultural element for change. In other words, coalitions may 
be one or more subcultures’ response to a stronger or more dominant culture’s (i.e., the 
‘corporate’ culture) inability to respond and adapt. Just as I have argued that social 
network analysis can integrate (advance) laboratory and field research into coalitions, 
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SNA may also provide a key means by which research on subcultures and coalitions 
combine. 
 A deeper investigation into the literatures on social movements and planned 
change also shows promise for advancing the current study.  Social movements are 
identified as the building and reproducing of dense informal networks between a 
multiplicity of actors, sharing a collective identity, and engaged in social and/or political 
conflict (Diani & Bison, 2004). Though these tend to be multi-organizational or 
community focused, social movement research may help highlight and uncover 
possibilities for truly socially oriented coalition activity. This is supported by Simpson’s 
(2004) notion of fairness and the idea that group (coalition) members can choose to act 
in concert for the collective good of a larger group. 
 From a coalition perspective, planned change within organizations represents a 
favorable use or outcome of coalition activity. This is not to suggest that coalitions are 
not viewed favorably in the subculture or social movement literatures. Rather, planned 
change specifically focuses on the benefits of informal groups in overcoming institutional 
impediments to change. Again, it may be that the coalitions are necessary change 
mechanisms as suggested by Buchanan and Badham (1999). Software’s poor 
performance was a known threat to its existence. Perhaps the coalitions were a 
response to that threat and helped focus attention on other (i.e., inappropriate) corporate 
activities. 
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Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
 
PREAMBLE 
 As you know I am conducting research on organizational decision-making. I would like 
to ask you a few questions regarding decisions in Software, but first I need some 
background information. 
 
BACKGROUND 
1. Name 
2. Sex (observation) 
3. Age 
4. Race 
5. How long have you worked at (company)? 
6. What is your position (title)? 
7. To what project are you currently assigned? 
8. Have you held any other positions with (company)? 
9. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
10. Where did you go to school? 
11. Have you worked with any current members of (company) prior to coming to 
(company)? 
If yes: with whom and where? 
12. Are you politically active? 
13. Do you think your actions make a difference in the world? 
 
PERCEPTION OF POWER 
14. Which people in (company) do you consider powerful or influential? 
15. Why do you think he/she is powerful or influential? 
 
COALITION IDENTIFICATION 
16. Which organizational decisions, events, or issues concern you because of their 
potential impact on your life? 
17. Have you done anything (tried to influence) about this? 
If yes: what? 
18. Do you plan to do anything about this? 
If yes: what? 
19. Do you think other people are concerned about this? 
If yes: who? 
20. Have you interacted with anyone regarding this? 
If yes: who? Who initiated interaction? 
21. Are you aware of any people who collaborate to exert influence in (company)? 
 
COALITION RATIONALE DATA (IF NECESSARY) 
22. Why did/do you interact with X, Y and Z? 
23. Why do/did you use that form of interaction? 
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Appendix B: Network Self-Report Instruments 
 
DATE:  April 1, 1997 
 
TO:  CONFIDENTIAL/Tampa 
 
FROM: Dean T. Walsh 
  USF Ph.D. program 
 
RE:  Research project 
 
 
Enclosed you will find the second of three surveys I am asking you to complete.  It 
should take only one to two minutes of your time.  Basically, this survey is designed to 
measure your interaction with others as a function of your job.  In other words, it is an 
indication of how frequently you work with other people in the organization due to your 
particular work requirements. 
 
This survey is intended for anyone who has completed the first survey (including 
contractors).  Please be sure to put your name on the survey and seal it in the envelope 
provided.  While your name is important to me it will not appear on any written 
document or verbal account associated with this research.  Once I have coded (two 
digit alpha-numeric values) your responses I will destroy the original form.  Once again, 
thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix B: (Continued) 
 
 
NAME:____________________________________ 
           (please print) 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Below is an alphabetical list of people in Software, Inc.  Please indicate the degree of 
interaction you have with each person as a result of your job during the average work 
week. 
 
For this research, interaction simply refers to any exchange or contact due to the 
execution of your work responsibilities. This includes providing direction and 
administration, delegating tasks, reporting work status, idea communication and 
clarification, collaboration, problem solving and advice. Types of interaction include face-
to-face conversation, electronic mail, voice mail, telephone conversation, and written 
memoranda. These interactions can take place within and outside the office. 
 
When you have finished, please place this form in the envelope provided, SEAL the 
envelope and place it in the large COBA RESEARCH envelope located at the front 
reception desk. 
 
Use the following scale to indicate the degree of your typical work interaction: 
 5) several times per day. 
 4) once per day. 
 3) several times per week. 
 2) once per week. 
 1) less than once per week. 
 0) no work interaction. 
 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
 
 
 
Please complete by [date] 
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Appendix B: (Continued) 
 
 
DATE:  April 14, 1997 
 
TO:  CONFIDENTIAL/Tampa 
 
FROM: Dean T. Walsh 
  USF Ph.D. program 
 
RE:  Research project 
 
 
Enclosed you will find the last survey I am asking you to complete.  It is quite similar to 
the second survey and should take only one to two minutes of your time.  This survey 
also is designed to measure your interaction with others; however, it addresses your 
non-work (or social) interactions.  Examples of this type of interaction are listed in the 
survey instructions. 
 
Please be sure to put your name on the survey, SEAL it in the envelope provided, and 
place it in the manila envelope located at the front desk.  Again, while your name is 
important to me it will not appear on any written document or verbal account 
associated with this research.  Thank you for your continued cooperation. 
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Appendix B: (Continued) 
 
 
NAME____________________________________ 
 (please print) 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Below is an alphabetical list of people in Software, Inc.  Please indicate the frequency of 
the social (non-work) interaction you have with each person during the average work 
week. 
 
For this research, social interaction simply refers to any exchange or contact due to the 
creation and/or maintenance of states such as friendship, camaraderie, and 
companionship, etc.  Examples of social interaction include dining together, sharing 
break or leisure time, gossiping, car pooling, discussing current events, etc.  Types of 
social interaction include face-to-face conversation, electronic mail, voice mail, 
telephone conversation, and written notes.  These interactions can take place within and 
outside the office. 
 
When you have finished, please place this form in the envelope provided, SEAL the 
envelope and place it in the large COBA RESEARCH envelope located at the front 
reception desk. 
 
Use the following scale to indicate the degree of your social interactions: 
 5) several times per day. 
 4) once per day. 
 3) several times per week. 
 2) once per week. 
 1) less than once per week. 
 0) no social interaction. 
 
 
 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
_____ Last, First    _____ Last, First 
 
 
 
Please complete by [date] 
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Appendix C: Rokeach Value Survey 
 
 
DATE:  March 13, 1997 
 
TO:  CONFIDENTIAL/Tampa 
  Group leaders 
  Team members 
  Consultants 
  Staff 
 
FROM: Dean T. Walsh 
  USF COBA Ph.D. program 
 
RE:  First survey 
 
 
Enclosed you will find the first survey pertaining to my dissertation research on 
organizational decision-making. Please accept my sincerest thanks for your help in this 
project. Again, your complete confidentiality is guaranteed. 
 
Upon completion I will review my findings with your organization. In the mean time, if you 
have any questions please feel free to contact me at the numbers provided below. 
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Appendix C: (Continued) 
 
 
NAME:____________________ 
           (please print) 
 
 
 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
On the following pages are two sets of 18 values listed in alphabetical order. Your task is 
to rank the values of each set in order of their importance to YOU, as guiding principles 
in YOUR life. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
Study the list on the first page carefully. Then place a 1 next to the value that is most 
important to YOU, place a 2 next to the value that is second most important, etc. The 
value that is least important should be ranked 18. Work slowly and think carefully. If you 
change your mind, feel free to change your answers. 
 
Complete the first list, then go to the second list (last page) and repeat the ranking 
process. When you have finished, please place the form in the envelope provided, 
SEAL the envelope and place it in the larger envelope marked "COBA RESEARCH" 
located at the main desk. 
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Appendix C: (Continued) 
 
 
_____ A COMFORTABLE LIFE - a prosperous life 
 
_____ AN EXCITING LIFE - a stimulating, active life 
 
_____ A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT - lasting contribution 
 
_____ A WORLD AT PEACE - free of war and conflict 
 
_____ A WORLD OF BEAUTY - beauty of nature and the arts 
 
_____ EQUALITY - brotherhood, equal opportunity for all 
 
_____ FAMILY SECURITY - taking care of loved ones 
 
_____ FREEDOM - independence, free choice 
 
_____ HAPPINESS - contentedness 
 
_____ INNER HARMONY - freedom from inner conflict 
 
_____ MATURE LOVE - sexual and spiritual intimacy 
 
_____ NATIONAL SECURITY - protection from attack 
 
_____ PLEASURE - an enjoyable, leisurely life 
 
_____ SALVATION - saved, eternal life 
 
_____ SELF-RESPECT - self-esteem 
 
_____ SOCIAL RECOGNITION - respect, admiration 
 
_____ TRUE FRIENDSHIP - close companionship 
 
_____ WISDOM - a mature understanding of life 
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Appendix C: (Continued) 
 
_____ AMBITIOUS – hard working, aspiring 
 
_____ BROADMINDED - open-minded 
 
_____ CAPABLE competent, effective 
 
_____ CHEERFUL - lighthearted, joyful 
 
_____ CLEAN - neat, tidy 
 
_____ COURAGEOUS - standing up for your beliefs 
 
_____ FORGIVING - willing to pardon others 
 
_____ HELPFUL - working for the welfare of others 
 
_____ HONEST - sincere, truthful 
 
_____ IMAGINATIVE - daring, creative 
 
_____ INDEPENDENT - self-reliant, self-sufficient 
 
_____ INTELLECTUAL - intelligent, reflective 
 
_____ LOGICAL - consistent, rational 
 
_____ LOVING - affectionate, tender 
 
_____ OBEDIENT - dutiful, respectful 
 
_____ POLITE - courteous, well-mannered 
 
_____ RESPONSIBLE - dependable, reliable 
 
_____ SELF-CONTROLLED - restrained, self-disciplined 
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Appendix D: Participant’s Memo 
 
 
DATE:  March 4, 1997 
 
TO:  CONFIDENTIAL 
 
FROM: Dean T. Walsh 
  USF Ph.D. program 
 
RE:  Research project 
 
 
I will be conducting a portion of my dissertation research at your office. The focus of my 
dissertation is on organizational decision-making. 
 
Over the next few weeks I will ask you to complete three short surveys that should take 
less than 10 minutes (total) of your time. These will be followed by a brief interview. Your 
help in this project is greatly appreciated. 
 
To facilitate the collection of genuine comments any and all information provided to me 
will be held in strict confidence and your anonymity is guaranteed. You will be provided 
envelopes with which to seal your responses. In addition, all data will be maintained in 
an off-campus location accessible only by me. Upon completion of this research I will 
discuss my findings with you and answer any questions you may have. Thank you for 
your cooperation. 
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Appendix E: Network Data Sets 
 
 
Work Matrix (Actor by Actor) 
 
   A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AB 
A  0 0 5 1 0 5 2 5 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 5 0 0 0 5 0 1 
B  0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 
C  5 2 0 5 2 5 3 1 5 3 4 5 3 2 1 5 4 4 4 4 3 1 5 4 3 3 3 
D  1 0 5 0 5 2 5 0 5 1 2 5 5 1 5 4 0 1 5 5 1 5 1 5 1 4 1 
E  0 0 1 3 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 3 1 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 
F  5 4 5 3 4 0 4 5 2 5 3 5 3 3 1 5 3 3 3 2 5 1 3 3 5 2 5 
G  2 2 0 5 5 2 0 0 5 2 5 5 5 2 5 5 2 2 5 5 2 5 0 5 2 5 2 
H  5 3 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 
I  0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 3 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 
J  0 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 3 5 5 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 5 
K  1 0 4 3 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
L  1 3 5 5 5 3 5 1 5 2 5 0 5 3 5 5 2 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 1 4 3 
M  0 0 3 5 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
N  0 5 1 0 0 2 0 5 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 5 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 
O  0 0 1 5 5 1 5 0 1 0 2 5 2 1 0 4 0 0 5 4 0 5 1 5 0 5 0 
P  0 2 5 4 3 3 4 0 3 3 3 5 3 4 3 0 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 0 3 3 
Q  0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 0 0 5 0 3 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5  
R  1 5 4 1 1 3 1 1 1 5 0 3 1 5 0 4 5 0 1 1 4 0 3 1 0 0 5 
S  1 0 4 5 4 3 5 0 4 0 4 5 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 5 1 4 1 5 0 0 1 
T  1 0 4 5 4 1 5 0 4 0 3 5 5 0 3 3 0 1 4 0 1 3 1 4 0 2 1 
U  5 3 3 0 0 5 2 5 0 3 0 1 0 3 1 3 3 5 2 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 3 
V  0 0 1 4 4 0 5 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 5 3 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 
W  2 2 5 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 
X  1 1 4 4 4 1 5 0 5 1 2 5 4 1 5 2 1 1 5 3 1 3 0 0 1 3 1 
Y  5 0 3 0 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Z  0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 4 5 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AB 1 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 0 1 1 5 0 3 5 5 1 1 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 
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Appendix E: (Continued) 
 
 
Social Matrix (Actor by Actor) 
 
   A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AB 
A  0 2 4 2 3 4 5 5 2 3 0 5 2 3 0 2 1 3 3 3 5 0 0 2 4 0 5 
B  1 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 2 3 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 
C  4 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 4 0 4 2 1 1 0 0 4 3 0 4 1 0 1 3 2 3 1 
D  2 0 4 0 4 2 4 0 4 3 0 4 5 0 4 3 0 1 2 4 2 4 0 4 1 3 5 
E  0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 
F  5 3 5 3 3 0 4 5 3 4 1 3 4 3 1 3 3 4 3 2 5 0 4 3 4 2 3 
G  3 3 3 5 3 3 0 2 3 3 3 5 3 3 5 3 3 5 5 3 3 5 0 5 3 3 5 
H  5 5 0 1 5 5 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 5 0 1 
I  1 0 5 0 3 1 3 0 0 2 3 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 0 1 0 5 1 3 1 
J  1 3 1 2 1 5 3 2 1 0 3 2 2 3 0 3 5 5 1 3 3 1 2 1 1 0 5 
K  2 1 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 0 4 2 1 3 2 5 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 2 2 1  
L  3 3 1 5 3 3 5 1 3 2 1 0 5 3 3 3 2 3 5 5 3 2 1 5 2 2 3 
M  1 1 2 5 3 3 4 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 5 1 1 0 3 1 1 3 
N  1 5 3 1 3 1 2 0 1 5 0 2 1 0 1 3 5 5 1 1 2 0 1 3 1 2 5 
O  2 1 1 4 4 1 4 1 3 0 1 4 2 1 0 3 2 1 4 3 1 4 0 4 1 3 2 
P  1 1 3 3 1 0 3 0 2 2 0 5 0 2 0 0 2 4 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Q  0 5 4 0 2 1 4 4 0 5 5 2 0 5 1 4 0 5 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 5 
R  0 1 1 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S  3 1 3 4 3 2 5 0 2 2 0 5 4 1 4 4 1 4 0 4 3 3 0 4 2 1 4 
T  2 0 3 3 2 2 3 0 3 2 1 2 4 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
U  1 0 0 1 1 5 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
V  0 0 1 3 3 1 4 0 3 1 4 3 3 0 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 0 0 3 0 1 1  
W  2 4 5 4 1 5 2 1 0 4 2 4 1 4 2 5 2 4 4 0 4 2 0 2 4 2 5 
X  1 1 2 4 4 1 4 0 5 1 1 5 4 2 5 0 1 1 4 3 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 
Y  5 2 0 3 4 3 1 5 2 1 1 1 3 1 0 3 1 0 2 3 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 
Z  2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 4 2 3 1 3 2 0 3  
AB 3 3 2 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 0 4 3 3 0 4 0 4 3 3 3 2 1 3 3 0 0 
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Appendix F: Work Network Diagram 
 
Figure 2 
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Appendix G: Social Network Diagram 
 
Figure 3 
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Appendix H: Coalition 1 Diagram 
 
Figure 4 
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Appendix I: Coalition 2 Diagram 
 
 
Figure 5 
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Appendix J: RVS Data 
 
Table 9 
 
 
Instrumental Values                          
 F U R G L P S AB A B C D E H I J K M N O Q T V W X Y Z
Honest 1 13 6 7 1 3 1 1 9 4 1 4 10 1 5 1 14 1 1 10 11 1 3 1 10 1 12
Responsible 10 7 16 10 3 2 2 2 2 11 3 1 3 11 2 6 7 12 5 4 3 2 5 5 6 5 11
Capable 3 8 2 13 15 1 6 7 7 2 14 2 12 5 3 2 15 7 10 17 8 17 2 6 4 9 6
Ambitious 9 2 1 14 11 7 15 6 11 1 11 10 4 6 8 9 4 5 13 1 2 11 1 4 13 18 9
Intellectual 15 5 12 8 13 10 12 9 4 8 6 8 7 9 6 12 13 2 3 3 6 3 11 9 8 3 4
Cheerful 7 10 15 1 16 14 7 5 3 15 10 5 5 3 16 8 3 3 9 7 5 14 6 15 2 10 1
Independent    11 1 10 6 6 4 8 12 5 7 5 9 18 2 14 13 6 8 15 15 9 4 4 11 1 16 7
Loving 2 15 4 2 10 12 3 3 1 10 2 17 8 18 11 16 11 9 8 16 1 8 16 17 5 2 2
Logical 16 6 5 12 8 15 14 16 10 9 13 11 11 10 1 5 9 10 4 8 14 7 8 3 3 4 5
Broadminded 8 3 17 5 2 6 11 11 8 14 17 14 6 7 13 3 1 4 11 2 10 12 13 7 7 17 10
Helpful 14 14 8 3 7 13 5 15 14 5 4 3 2 17 9 4 2 6 18 18 13 6 10 8 15 13 17
Courageous 12 9 11 4 12 8 10 4 12 3 9 15 14 8 7 7 12 14 6 13 7 18 12 16 12 7 14
Imaginative 17 4 7 11 14 11 18 10 6 6 7 18 1 12 12 10 8 13 14 14 4 16 15 12 9 6 3
Forgiving 13 12 9 15 5 5 4 14 15 16 8 13 17 15 15 14 5 11 2 11 17 15 7 13 11 12 16
Polite 5 17 3 9 4 9 16 8 13 17 12 7 9 14 10 15 17 17 16 5 15 10 9 14 17 11 15
Self-controlled 16 18 16 9 17 13 17 16 12 15 12 16 4 4 11 18 15 7 6 16 9 14 2 16 14 13
Clean 6 11 14 18 17 16 9 13 17 13 16 6 13 13 17 17 16 16 12 12 12 5 17 18 14 8 8
Obedient 18 18 13 17 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 16 15 16 18 18 10 18 17 9 18 13 18 10 18 15 18
4 
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Appendix J: RVS Data (Continued) 
 
Table 9 
 
Terminal Values                            
 F U R G L P S AB A B C D E H I J K M N O Q T V W X Y Z
Happiness 1 11 4 3 1 14 4 7 5 5 4 2 6 6 10 4 8 7 9 10 11 1 4 7 5 8 3
Pleasure 2 8 13 4 9 15 7 3 1 9 14 3 10 14 12 11 11 1 12 2 12 9 3 8 4 12 7
Mature Love 3 18 10 9 12 11 1 2 10 6 3 12 7 12 14 10 10 4 2 14 2 15 18 3 8 2 8
Inner Harmony 4 5 5 5 2 12 3 11 8 13 12 6 3 5 11 5 16 8 1 16 7 16 9 4 3 6 4
Wisdom 5 9 18 7 5 13 9 8 12 14 7 10 9 13 1 13 14 13 6 8 3 11 6 6 13 1 2
A World of Beauty 6 14 11 13 17 8 17 12 3 10 18 15 16 17 15 16 18 16 15 18 13 17 11 14 14 10 10
True Friendship 7 6 17 11 8 6 5 9 4 15 9 9 8 11 2 7 5 6 8 7 9 6 8 2 10 3 9
An Exciting Life 8 2 6 8 18 7 12 4 17 3 15 18 12 2 13 9 6 14 14 13 8 3 5 15 12 15 5
Freedom 9 3 3 12 3 1 8 6 11 12 6 8 4 1 7 12 15 12 10 5 14 14 12 11 6 4 13
A Sense of 
Accomplishment 10 4 7 14 11 3 13 5 6 4 13 5 13 4 4 2 1 9 11 11 4 2 7 13 16 14 15
A Comfortable Life 11 1 1 2 7 4 11 1 2 2 8 4 5 3 8 6 7 2 7 6 5 7 2 10 15 16 6
A World at Peace 12 15 8 16 16 16 14 17 15 18 11 16 17 8 16 15 13 15 18 15 16 13 13 17 1 13 11
Equality 13 17 12 18 13 17 15 18 16 11 17 17 14 9 6 14 9 11 17 12 17 12 15 9 18 9 12
Family Security 14 10 2 1 6 9 6 10 7 1 1 1 2 7 5 1 4 3 5 1 1 4 1 1 7 7 18
Social Recognition 15 12 15 10 10 10 18 16 13 8 16 13 11 16 9 8 3 10 13 4 10 10 16 12 17 17 17
Self-Respect 16 7 16 6 4 5 2 14 9 7 2 11 1 10 3 3 2 5 3 3 6 5 10 5 9 5 16
National Security 17 16 9 17 15 2 16 13 14 17 10 14 15 15 18 18 12 17 16 9 15 8 14 18 2 11 14
Salvation 18 13 14 15 14 18 10 15 18 16 5 7 18 18 17 17 17 18 4 17 18 18 17 16 11 18 1
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Appendix K: Coalition and Non-Coalition RVS Means 
 
Table 10 
 
TERMINAL VALUES C1     C2     Non 
A Comfortable Life 4.33   A Comfortable Life 5.00   Family Security 4.05 
Inner Harmony 4.67   Happiness 5.80   Happiness 6.05 
Freedom 5.00   Freedom 6.00   Self-Respect 6.05 
An Exciting Life 5.33   Self-Respect 6.20   A Comfortable Life 6.37 
Happiness 5.33   Family Security 6.40   True Friendship 7.26 
A Sense of Accomplishment 7.00   Inner Harmony 6.60   Inner Harmony 8.05 
Pleasure 7.67   Mature Love 7.00   A Sense of Accomplishment 8.11 
Family Security 8.67   Pleasure 7.60   Pleasure 8.16 
True Friendship 10.00   True Friendship 7.80   Mature Love 8.42 
A World of Beauty 10.33   Wisdom 8.40   Wisdom 8.53 
Mature Love 10.33   A Sense of Accomplishment 9.20   Freedom 9.32 
Wisdom 10.67   An Exciting Life 9.80   An Exciting Life 10.47
A World at Peace 11.67   National Security 12.60   Social Recognition 11.74
Self-Respect 13.00   Social Recognition 12.80   Equality 12.89
Equality 14.00   A World of Beauty 13.40   National Security 13.53
National Security 14.00   Salvation 14.40   A World at Peace 13.74
Social Recognition 14.00   A World at Peace 15.80   A World of Beauty 14.00
Salvation 15.00   Equality 16.20   Salvation 14.26
                
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES C1     C2    Non 
Ambitious 4.00   Honest 2.60  Honest 5.26 
Capable 4.33   Responsible 3.80  Responsible 5.47 
Honest 6.67   Loving 6.00  Intellectual 6.58 
Loving 7.00   Broadminded 7.00  Cheerful 7.37 
Independent 7.33   Independent 7.20  Ambitious 7.42 
Polite 8.33   Courageous 7.60  Logical 7.63 
Logical 9.00   Capable 8.40  Capable 7.79 
Broadminded 9.33   Cheerful 8.60  Independent 8.89 
Imaginative 9.33   Forgiving 8.60  Broadminded 9.26 
Clean 10.33   Helpful 8.60  Loving 9.37 
Cheerful 10.67   Polite 9.20  Helpful 9.68 
Courageous 10.67   Intellectual 10.40  Imaginative 9.79 
Intellectual 10.67   Ambitious 10.60  Courageous 10.84
Responsible 11.00   Imaginative 12.80  Self-controlled 11.58
Forgiving 11.33   Logical 13.00  Forgiving 12.26
Helpful 12.00   Self-controlled 14.40  Polite 12.79
Self-controlled 12.67   Clean 14.60  Clean 13.16
Obedient 16.33   Obedient 17.60  Obedient 15.84
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Appendix K: RVS Rank Order Differences Between Coalition 1, 
 Coalition 2 and Non-Coalition Members 
 
Table 11 
 
 
TERMINAL VALUES C1-Non C2-Non C1-C2 
A Comfortable Life 3 3 0 
A Sense of Accomplishment 1 4 5 
A World at Peace 4 0 4 
A World of Beauty 7 2 5 
An Exciting Life 8 0 8 
Equality 1 4 3 
Family Security 7 4 3 
Freedom 8 8 0 
Happiness 3 0 3 
Inner Harmony 4 0 4 
Mature Love 2 2 4 
National Security 1 2 3 
Pleasure 1 0 1 
Salvation 0 2 2 
Self-Respect 11 1 10 
Social Recognition 3 1 4 
True Friendship 4 4 0 
Wisdom 2 0 2 
        
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES C1-Non C2-Non C1-C2 
Ambitious 4 8 12 
Broadminded 1 5 1 
Capable 5 0 5 
Cheerful 7 4 3 
Clean 7 0 7 
Courageous 1 7 6 
Forgiving 0 6 6 
Helpful 5 1 6 
Honest 2 0 2 
Imaginative 3 2 5 
Independent 3 3 0 
Intellectual 10 9 1 
Logical 1 9 8 
Loving 6 7 1 
Obedient 0 0 0 
Polite 10 5 5 
Responsible 12 0 12 
Self-controlled 3 2 1 
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Appendix L: Social Network Degree Centrality 
 
Table 12 
 
Binary Data 
 
           OutDegree      InDegree     NrmOutDeg    NrmInDeg 
        ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
 26  Z        26.000       16.000      100.000       61.538 
 12  L        26.000       24.000      100.000       92.308 
 11  K        25.000       16.000       96.154       61.538 
  7  G        25.000       25.000       96.154       96.154 
  6  F        25.000       24.000       96.154       92.308 
 15  O        24.000       17.000       92.308       65.385 
 10  J        24.000       22.000       92.308       84.615 
 23  W        24.000        9.000       92.308       34.615 
 24  X        23.000       22.000       88.462       84.615 
 14  N        23.000       21.000       88.462       80.769 
 19  S        23.000       20.000       88.462       76.923 
 27 AB        22.000       24.000       84.615       92.308 
  1  A        21.000       22.000       80.769       84.615 
 13  M        21.000       21.000       80.769       80.769 
 25  Y        21.000       21.000       80.769       80.769 
 22  V        20.000       14.000       76.923       53.846 
 20  T        20.000       22.000       76.923       84.615 
  4  D        20.000       23.000       76.923       88.462 
  2  B        19.000       19.000       73.077       73.077 
  9  I        18.000       19.000       69.231       73.077 
  3  C        17.000       21.000       65.385       80.769 
 16  P        17.000       19.000       65.385       73.077 
 17  Q        16.000       21.000       61.538       80.769 
  8  H        15.000       13.000       57.692       50.000 
 21  U        13.000       23.000       50.000       88.462 
 18  R        13.000       22.000       50.000       84.615 
  5  E         4.000       25.000       15.385       96.154 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
                   OutDegree      InDegree     NrmOutDeg      NrmInDeg 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        20.185       20.185       77.635       77.635 
  2  Std Dev         4.892        3.801       18.814       14.619 
  3      Sum       545.000      545.000     2096.154     2096.154 
  4 Variance        23.929       14.447      353.974      213.716 
  5      SSQ     11647.000    11391.000   172292.906   168505.922 
  6    MCSSQ       646.074      390.074     9557.310     5770.328 
  7 Euc Norm       107.921      106.729      415.082      410.495 
  8  Minimum         4.000        9.000       15.385       34.615 
  9  Maximum        26.000       25.000      100.000       96.154 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 23.225% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 19.231% 
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Appendix L: Work Network Degree Centrality 
 
Table 13 
 
 
Binary Data 
 
             OutDegree      InDegree     NrmOutDeg      NrmInDeg 
        ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
 23  W        26.000       13.000      100.000       50.000 
  3  C        26.000       25.000      100.000       96.154 
  6  F        26.000       19.000      100.000       73.077 
 12  L        26.000       21.000      100.000       80.769 
 24  X        24.000       15.000       92.308       57.692 
 27 AB        23.000       19.000       88.462       73.077 
  7  G        23.000       21.000       88.462       80.769 
  4  D        23.000       18.000       88.462       69.231 
 16  P        23.000       23.000       88.462       88.462 
 18  R        21.000       16.000       80.769       61.538 
 20  T        20.000       17.000       76.923       65.385 
 19  S        18.000       19.000       69.231       73.077 
 15  O        17.000       18.000       65.385       69.231 
 21  U        17.000       20.000       65.385       76.923 
  1  A        15.000       15.000       57.692       57.692 
  9  I        13.000       15.000       50.000       57.692 
 14  N        13.000       17.000       50.000       65.385 
  5  E        13.000       16.000       50.000       61.538 
 22  V        13.000       14.000       50.000       53.846 
 11  K        12.000       16.000       46.154       61.538 
 13  M        12.000       17.000       46.154       65.385 
 10  J        10.000       15.000       38.462       57.692 
 17  Q         9.000       15.000       34.615       57.692 
  2  B         9.000       14.000       34.615       53.846 
 26  Z         8.000       13.000       30.769       50.000 
 25  Y         7.000       12.000       26.923       46.154 
  8  H         7.000       11.000       26.923       42.308 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
                   OutDegree      InDegree     NrmOutDeg         NrmInDeg 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        16.815       16.815       64.672       64.672 
  2  Std Dev         6.435        3.266       24.750       12.563 
  3      Sum       454.000      454.000     1746.154     1746.154 
  4 Variance        41.410       10.669      612.576      157.832 
  5      SSQ      8752.000     7922.000   129467.453   117189.344 
  6    MCSSQ      1118.074      288.074    16539.559     4261.451 
  7 Euc Norm        93.552       89.006      359.816      342.329 
  8  Minimum         7.000       11.000       26.923       42.308 
  9  Maximum        26.000       25.000      100.000       96.154 
 
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 36.686% 
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 32.692% 
 
Appendix M: Social Network Degree Centrality 
 
Table 14 
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 Valued Data 
 
           OutDegree     InDegree 
        ------------ ------------ 
  7  G        90.000       82.000   
  6  F        83.000       59.000       
 12  L        77.000       73.000      
 23  W        75.000       14.000       
 27 AB        69.000       67.000       
 19  S        69.000       53.000      
  1  A        68.000       51.000      
 26  Z        66.000       32.000     
  4  D        65.000       67.000       
 17  Q        59.000       49.000       
 10  J        59.000       55.000      
 15  O        57.000       42.000      
 11  K        57.000       35.000     
 14  N        55.000       44.000       
 24  X        55.000       63.000     
 13  M        47.000       56.000       
 25  Y        47.000       45.000     
 22  V        44.000       31.000     
  3  C        43.000       60.000     
  8  H        42.000       36.000     
  9  I        41.000       54.000     
 20  T        41.000       66.000     
 16  P        36.000       54.000     
  2  B        29.000       47.000     
 21  U        25.000       59.000     
 18  R        20.000       67.000     
  5  E        12.000       70.000     
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
                   OutDegree      InDegree  
              ------------ ------------  
  1     Mean        53.000       53.000  
  2  Std Dev        18.829       14.787  
  3      Sum      1431.000     1431.000    
  4 Variance       354.519      218.667    
  5      SSQ     85415.000    81747.000   
  6    MCSSQ      9572.000     5904.000   
  7 Euc Norm       292.258      285.914   
  8  Minimum        12.000       14.000   
  9  Maximum        90.000       82.000   
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Appendix M: Work Network Degree Centrality 
 
Table 15 
 
 
Valued Data 
 
             OutDegree      InDegree  
        ------------ ------------  
 12  L        96.000       76.000  
  6  F        92.000       55.000  
  3  C        89.000       80.000  
  7  G        85.000       70.000  
 16  P        78.000       81.000  
  4  D        75.000       62.000  
 19  S        67.000       60.000  
 24  X        64.000       55.000  
 23  W        61.000       25.000  
 20  T        60.000       54.000  
 15  O        57.000       55.000  
 18  R        56.000       52.000  
 21  U        53.000       62.000  
 27 AB        51.000       51.000  
 22  V        48.000       43.000  
 17  Q        41.000       50.000   
  1  A        38.000       37.000   
 10  J        38.000       46.000   
 14  N        36.000       52.000   
 13  M        33.000       53.000   
 11  K        31.000       43.000   
  2  B        31.000       47.000   
  5  E        28.000       52.000   
 26  Z        27.000       36.000   
  9  I        26.000       49.000   
 25  Y        25.000       32.000   
  8  H        25.000       33.000   
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
                   OutDegree      InDegree  
              ------------ ------------  
  1     Mean        52.259       52.259  
  2  Std Dev        22.041       13.645  
  3      Sum      1411.000     1411.000  
  4 Variance       485.822      186.192  
  5      SSQ     86855.000    78765.000  
  6    MCSSQ     13117.186     5027.185  
  7 Euc Norm       294.712      280.651  
  8  Minimum        25.000       25.000  
  9  Maximum        96.000       81.000  
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Appendix N: Coalition 1 Structural Equivalence 
 
Table 16 
 
Pearson Correlation 
 
STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
 
           1     2     3 
           F     U     R 
       ----- ----- ----- 
  1 F   1.00  0.99  0.97 
  2 U   0.99  1.00  0.95 
  3 R   0.97  0.95  1.00 
 
 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
 
        F U R 
 
Level   1 2 3 
-----   - - - 
0.987   XXX . 
0.955   XXXXX 
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Appendix N: Coalition 2 Structural Equivalence 
Table 17 
Pearson Correlation 
 
STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
 
            1     2     3     4     5 
            G     L     S     P    AB 
        ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  G   1.00  0.78  0.89  0.73  0.79 
  2  L   0.78  1.00  0.91  0.80  0.60 
  3  S   0.89  0.91  1.00  0.76  0.86 
  4  P   0.73  0.80  0.76  1.00  0.70 
  5 AB   0.79  0.60  0.86  0.70  1.00 
 
 
 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
 
                A 
        P G S L B 
 
Level   4 1 3 2 5 
-----   - - - - - 
0.907   . . XXX . 
0.854   . XXXXX . 
0.777   . XXXXXXX 
0.730   XXXXXXXXX 
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Appendix N: Work Network Structural Equivalence 
Table 18 
 
PEARSON CORRELATION (VALUED DATA) 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
 
                                                             A 
         P K I M O G L E S D T V X Z C W F U H A Y N Q R B J B 
 
         1 1   1 1   1   1   2 2 2 2   2   2     2 1 1 1   1 2 
 Level   6 1 9 3 5 7 2 5 9 4 0 2 4 6 3 3 6 1 8 1 5 4 7 8 2 0 7 
------   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 0.959   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX 
 0.944   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . XXX 
 0.926   . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . XXX 
 0.905   . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . . . . . XXX . . . XXXXX 
 0.895   . . . . . . . . XXXXX . . . . . . . . XXX . . . XXXXX 
 0.892   . . . . . . . . XXXXX . . . . . . . . XXX . . XXXXXXX 
 0.863   . . . . . . . . XXXXXXX . . . . . . . XXX . . XXXXXXX 
 0.850   . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXX . . . . . . XXX . . XXXXXXX 
 0.841   . . . . . XXX . XXXXXXXXX . . . . . . XXX . . XXXXXXX 
 0.834   . . . . . XXX . XXXXXXXXX . . . . . . XXX . XXXXXXXXX 
 0.826   . . . . . XXX XXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . . XXX . XXXXXXXXX 
 0.813   . . . . . XXX XXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . XXXXX . XXXXXXXXX 
 0.790   . . . . . XXX XXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.777   . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.766   . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.760   . . XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.717   . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.635   . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . . XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.587   . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.542   . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . . . XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.517   . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . XXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.490   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . XXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.410   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.229   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
 0.187   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
-0.027   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
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Appendix N: Social Network Structural Equivalence 
Table 19 
 
PEARSON CORRELATION (VALUED DATA) 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
 
                                                            A 
        E C K G L S I D M T V O X Z J N Q W A F H Y B R U P B 
 
            1   1 1     1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2       2   1 2 1 2 
Level   5 3 1 7 2 9 9 4 3 0 2 5 4 6 0 4 7 3 1 6 8 5 2 8 1 6 7 
-----   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.762   . . . . . . . . . . XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
0.745   . . . . XXX . . . . XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
0.697   . . . . XXX . XXX . XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
0.671   . . . XXXXX . XXX . XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
0.640   . . . XXXXX . XXX . XXXXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
0.629   . . . XXXXX . XXX . XXXXX . . . . . . . . . . XXX . . 
0.626   . . . XXXXX . XXX . XXXXX . . . . . XXX . . . XXX . . 
0.608   . . . XXXXX . XXX . XXXXX . . . . . XXX . . . XXX XXX 
0.606   . . . XXXXX . XXXXX XXXXX . . . . . XXX . . . XXX XXX 
0.593   . . . XXXXX . XXXXX XXXXX . XXX . . XXX . . . XXX XXX 
0.579   . . . XXXXX . XXXXX XXXXX . XXX . . XXX XXX . XXX XXX 
0.574   . . . XXXXX . XXXXX XXXXX . XXXXX . XXX XXX . XXX XXX 
0.572   . . . XXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXX . XXXXX . XXX XXX . XXX XXX 
0.552   . . . XXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXX . XXXXX . XXX XXX XXXXX XXX 
0.550   . . . XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXX . XXX XXX XXXXX XXX 
0.501   . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXX . XXX XXX XXXXX XXX 
0.483   . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXX . XXXXXXX XXXXX XXX 
0.470   . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXX . XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX 
0.415   . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX . XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX 
0.409   . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX 
0.282   . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX 
0.259   . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.212   . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.180   . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.081   . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.054   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
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Appendix O: Work Network N-Clans 
Table 20 
 
SUB-GROUP ANALYSES 
N-CLANS 
N = 1 
 
TOTAL GROUPS IDENTIFIED: 46 
 
ACTOR NUMBER OF GROUPS PERCENT OF TOTAL 
L 35 76.09% 
F 33 71.74% 
P 31 67.39% 
C 29 63.04% 
AB 26 56.62% 
D 25 54.35% 
S 24 52.17% 
T 19 41.30% 
G 17 36.96% 
U 17 36.96% 
A 14 30.43% 
O 14 30.43% 
R 13 28.26% 
W 8 17.39% 
X 8 17.39% 
K 7 15.22% 
M 6 13.04% 
N 5 10.87% 
E 4 8.70% 
V 4 8.70% 
H 3 6.52% 
J 3 6.52% 
Y 3 6.52% 
B 2 4.35% 
I 2 4.35% 
Q 2 4.35% 
Z 2 4.35% 
   
MEAN 13.19 28.66% 
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Appendix O: Social Network N-Clans 
Table 21 
 
SUB-GROUP ANALYSES 
N-CLANS 
N = 1 
 
TOTAL GROUPS IDENTIFIED: 75 
 
ACTOR NUMBER OF GROUPS PERCENT OF TOTAL 
L 60 80.00% 
G 59 78.67% 
F 54 72.00% 
X 42 56.00% 
J 36 48.00% 
N 36 48.00% 
AB 29 38.67% 
S 27 36.00% 
T 26 34.67% 
M 24 32.00% 
A 21 28.00% 
I 21 28.00% 
Y 20 26.67% 
Z 17 22.67% 
D 16 21.33% 
R 14 18.67% 
B 13 17.33% 
C 12 16.00% 
K 12 16.00% 
0 12 16.00% 
P 12 16.00% 
Q 12 16.00% 
U 10 13.33% 
V 8 10.67% 
W 7 9.33% 
H 4 5.33% 
E 1 1.33% 
   
MEAN 22.41 29.88% 
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Appendix P: Work Network Lambda Sets 
Table 22 
 
 
 
HIERARCHICAL LAMBDA SET PARTITIONS 
 
                                                             A 
         Z H Y B Q J I K E M N V A W X R U O T D S F G L C P B 
 
         2   2   1 1   1   1 1 2   2 2 1 2 1 2   1     1   1 2 
Lambda   6 8 5 2 7 0 9 1 5 3 4 2 1 3 4 8 1 5 0 4 9 6 7 2 3 6 7 
------   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
    23   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX . 
    21   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXX . 
    19   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXX 
    18   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    17   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    16   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    14   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    13   . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    12   . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    11   . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    10   . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
     9   . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
     7   . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
     6   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
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Appendix P: Social Network Lambda Sets 
Table 23 
 
 
 
HIERARCHICAL LAMBDA SET PARTITIONS 
 
 
                                                             A 
         E W H U P Q R V C B K I O Z A D M S Y T N J F L G X B 
 
           2   2 1 1 1 2     1   1 2     1 1 2 2 1 1   1   2 2 
Lambda   5 3 8 1 6 7 8 2 3 2 1 9 5 6 1 4 3 9 5 0 4 0 6 2 7 4 7 
------   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
    24   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX . . 
    23   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXX . . 
    21   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXX . 
    20   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    19   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    18   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    16   . . . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    15   . . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    14   . . . . . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    13   . . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    12   . . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
    11   . . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
     9   . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
     4   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
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Appendix Q: Quadratic Assignment Procedure 
 
Table 24 
 
 
 
QAP Pearson Correlations 
Between Square Matrices 
 
 
 Coalition 1 Coalition 2 
Work Subset .379 .205 
Social Subset .657 .594 
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